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INTRODUCTION
Running on a platform that faulted the federal judiciary for
favoring the rights of criminal defendants and for tolerating
affirmative action, Ronald Reagan became President of the
United States in 1981.' In the election of Reagan, the right-
wing message of 1964 Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater,
endorsing a far-right judicial agenda including positions against
civil rights legislation and for greater law enforcement discre-
tion, enjoyed a new level of social and political acceptability
with President Reagan as its vanguard.2
Reagan promised to appoint individuals to the federal
judiciary who would "let Congress, the president, and the state
legislators do what they want unless it clearly contravenes the
precise words of the Constitution - for example, regulate or
forbid abortions, adopt prayers in public schools, impose capital
punishment, [and] authorize police to engage in [warrantless]
wire tapping... ."' In its appointment of federal judges and
administrative officials, "[t]he Reagan Administration pursued
I JAMES M. BURNS ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE 174-75 (1987). Of
course, other components of his campaign, such as economic recovery and
military strength (emphasizing President Carter's weakness as illustrated by
the Iranian hostage situation), played a major role in his election. Id. at 504,
445.
2 Id. at 173-75. But cf Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus,
Publicity, Public Opinion, and the Court, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 985, 995-96 (1990)
(charting public opinion on court decisions and commenting as a subsidiary
matter that 'iTn 1964, Barry Goldwater tried to make the Court's decisions on
criminal justice a critical issue in his Presidential campaign .... In later
years, criminal justice became more salient, but the lag was too long to credit
or blame Goldwater's campaign").
' BURNS, supra note 1, at 374 (discussing Attorney General Edwin Meese
III's remarks entitled "On the Theory of a Jurisprudence of Original Inten-
tion," in which he suggested that Reagan wanted only interpretivists in the
judiciary. In that speech, he also argued "that the accepted view that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates most provisions of the Bill of Rights is
'constitutionally suspect."') (citing Edwin Meese III, Address to the American
Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in TODAY JOURNAL, November 15, 1985, at 6,
and a contemporaneous criticism of interpretivism by Justice William
Brennan, Excerpts of Brennan's Speech on Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, October
13, 1985, at A36 (Address of Justice William Brennan at Georgetown
University (Oct. 12, 1985) (on file at the Supreme Court) [hereinafter
Brennan's Speech]). See generally HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS:
THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION (1988) (detailing
the Reagan Administration's efforts to appoint ideologically conservative
individuals to the federal judiciary).
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its agenda with a single-mindedness that perhaps was un-
equaled by any of its recent predecessors.""
During his campaign for the presidency, Ronald Reagan
promised to appoint a woman to the Supreme Court.5 In 1981,
President Reagan fulfilled that pledge after the Senate con-
firmed his nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor to serve as an
Associate Justice on the Court.' Justice O'Connor's votes and
decisions regarding Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19647 and
the rights of criminal defendants demonstrate the extent to
which her jurisprudence coincided with President Reagan's
political goal of changing the law in these areas.' This Article
contends that Justice O'Connor's frequent refusals during her
confirmation hearings to answer questions relating to ideology,
judicial philosophy, and many constitutional doctrines9 f6re-
closed a meaningful Senate dialogue about the extent to which
her nomination was a vehicle for the achievement of President
Reagan's legal agenda.
This analysis of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's votes and
opinions demonstrates that the Senate has a legitimate role in
Drew S. Days I, The Courts' Response to the Reagan Civil Rights
Agenda, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1003, 1010 (1989).
5 PETER W. HUBER, SANDRA DAY O'CoNNoR 13-15 (1990) (a biographical
profile on the first woman Supreme Court.Justice as part of a book series on
American Women of Achievement).
" Id.; see also HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 330-39 (2d ed.
1985) (describing the selection process for her nomination).
7 Title VII- Equal Employment Opportunity, 42 U.S.C §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1988 and Supp. 1992).
8 For recent articles discussing the significance of O'Connor's role on the
Court, see Tony Mauro, Ten Years Later, O'Connor Still Not Tipping Her
Hand, N.J. L.J., June 27, 1991, at 18; Russell W. Galloway, Justice in the
Middle: How Sandra Day O'Connor, a 'Goldwater Republican,' Could Stop
the High Court's Slide to the Far Right, L-A DAILY J., April 2, 1990, at 6;
James M. Rubin, Justice O'Connor's Vote Often Decisive, CICAGO DAILY L.
BULL., March 26, 1990, at 1; see also Stephen J. Wermeil, O'Connor: A Dual
Role, 13 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 129 (1991).
' She insisted that her refusal was necessary to show her impartiality
and unbiased attitude toward cases. See Grover Rees I, Questions for
Supreme Court Nominees at Confirmation Hearings: Excluding the Constitu-
tion, 17 GA. L. REv. 913 (1983) (discussing Justice O'Connor's frequent refusal
to answer questions and severely criticizing the notion that a nominee may
invoke the impropriety of answering); see also infra notes 17-27 and accompa-
nying text.
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investigating and discussing a judicial nominee's jurisprudential
philosophy, ideology, and consequent policy preferences during
the advice and consent process. 0 Justice O'Connor exemplifies
how all justices come to the Court with some form of judicial
philosophy and political ideology" that significantly affects their
approaches to cases. 2 The correlation between President
'o U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. This Article supports the validity of Senate
rejection of, or support for, a nominee on ideological grounds because of the
considerable effect a sitting Justice's ideology can have in changing and
developing federal law. See Lloyd N. Cutler, The Limits of Advice and
Consent, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 876, 878 (1990) ("[Elvery group in our society,
whether high or low, looks to the Supreme Court to defend and uphold its
rights. As the Constitution enters its third century, this is the most precious
and valuable thing about the Court."). Specific proposals for reforming the
advice and consent process, such as not directly questioning nominees, are
beyond the scope of this Article. See Gary Simson, Taking the Court
Seriously: A Proposed Approach to Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court
Nominees, 7 CONST. COMM. 283 (1990) [hereinafter Taking the Court
Seriously] (suggesting that the Senate give special attention to the potential
effect of a nominee on the outcome of important cases, the amount of public
confidence in the Court and the degree of fairness in the Court's decision
making process); William Ross, The Questioning of Supreme Court Nominees
at Senate Confirmation Hearings: Proposals for Accommodating the Needs of
the Senate and Ameliorating the Fears of the Nominees, 62 TUL. L. REV. 109
(1987) (discussing Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and O'Connor and their refusals
to answer various questions); see also Gary Simson, Thomas' Supreme
Unfitness -A Letter to the Senate on Advice and Consent, 78 CORNELL L.
REV. 619 (1993) (evaluating the advice and consent process and urging the
Senate to reform the process for assessing the qualifications of nominees).
" This Article follows the realist proposition that judges have agendas,
ideologies, or philosophical perspectives that significantly influence their
decision making. Thus, neither laws nor judges are 'neutral.' See, e.g.,
Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: In Search of
Constitutional Roles and Responsibilities, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1986)
(articulation of the accepted realist position).
' Judicial philosophies of restraint or activism are not necessarily
associated with any particular political perspective, as can be seen by
examining both the Lochner and Warren Courts, which could be considered
diametrically opposed in their political activism. See BURNS, supra note 1, at
374-75.
A nominee's previous political activities, the nominee's writings, judicial
record, or the nature of the nominee's law practice may help to identify a
nominee with a distinctly conservative or liberal ideology. See, e.g., Robert F.
Nagel, Advice, Consent, and Influence, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 858, 868 (1990).
Nevertheless, a few appointees' jurisprudential approaches have evolved
or dramatically changed over time; Nixon appointee Harry Blackmun provides
a good example of such a development. DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT:
THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 233-34 (1992).
IDEOLOGY & ADVICE AND CONSENT
Reagan's goals and Justice O'Connor's votes and decisions in the
areas of Title VII and the rights of the accused demonstrate the
considerable power to shape the law that the President wields
in choosing a Justice."3 Regardless of whether they were
nominated because of certain jurisprudential views they hold,
nominees should be required to discuss their views on federal
law and the role of judges before the Senate in the public forum
provided by the confirmation hearings.14
Part One of this Article examines Justice O'Connor's refusal
in her confirmation hearings to discuss the substance of her
jurisprudential approach to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the rights of criminal defendants. In Part Two, this
Article examines Justice O'Connor's approach on the Court to
these two areas of the law. Part Three discusses how this
analysis of Justice O'Connor's work supports Various theoretical
arguments for Senate investigation and discussion of Supreme
Court nominees' ideological perspectives, and the rejection or
confirmation of nominees based on this information.
I. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S REFUSAL TO DISCUSS
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AT HER
CONFIRMATION HEARINGS
During her Supreme Court confirmation hearings, Sandra
Day O'Connor stated that, if confirmed, her intention was to
" See infra notes 39-202 and accompanying text. Senator Paul Simon,
who currently sits on the Senate Judiciary Committee, observed that "[when
Presidents have tried to shape the Supreme Court through choosing someone
of a particular political and philosophical bent, they have generally been
successful." PAUL SIMON, ADVICE AND CONSENT 35 (1992).
"
4 Nagel, supra note 12, at 866-67 (advocating "substantive, ideological
Senate review" and proposing that nominees ought to provide substantial
information about their precise views of the law); see, e.g., Rees, supra note 9,
at 966-67; Charles Black, A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme
Court Nominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657 (1970). Burns notes that
[tihe selection process focuses on evaluating nominees' legal compe-
tence, integrity, and judicial temperaments. These qualities are
essential but not sufficient. Federal judges have too much power
and too much discretion to be appointed without inquiry into and
concern about their political views and basic values.
BURNS, supra note 1, at 372. While not necessarily the determining factor,
ideology should play an important role in the Senate's consideration of a
nominee.
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find the law rather than to make it."5 But she had been chosen
for the court as a result of President Reagan's campaign to
change federal jurisprudence by appointing federal judges
aligned with him ideologically. 16 Justice O'Connor refused to
answer questions about issues such as abortion, affirmative
action, and the rights of criminal defendants that would have
helped the Senators understand her considered approach to
these highly contentious issues of federal law. 7 O'Connor
obliquely stated that the federal judiciary should display greater
respect for the decisions of governmental officials." O'Connor
responded to questions regarding constitutional issues by either
summarizing the Court's holdings in the area, such as
desegregation, or by observing that commentators were divided
on the issue. 9 In this way she deflected questions about
5 Nomination of Sandra O'Connor: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Judge Sandra Day O'Connor of Arizona
to Serve as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1981) [hereinafter O'Connor Hearings]. At her
hearings, O'Connor discussed the difference between legislating and judging:
As a legislator it was my task to vote on public policy issues and
to try to translate into a statutory form certain precepts that were
developed as a matter of social or public policy in ways which would
then govern the residents of our State.
As a judge it is not my function to continue to try to develop
public policy by means of making the law. It is simply my role to
interpret the laws which the legislature has passed, to try to do
that in accordance with the intent of the framers.
Id. at 68; see also HUBER supra note 5, at 16 (O'Connor declined to answer
questions regarding ideology or policy preferences, "steadfastly refus[ing] to
predict how she would vote as a Supreme Court justice, particularly on the
politically sensitive issue of abortion.").
6 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 333-34 ("[Allthough Reagan hoped to fulfill
his campaign pledge to appoint a woman to the Supreme Court, he insisted
that his nominee meet his political ideological criteria."); cf Martin Shapiro,
Interest Groups and Supreme Court Appointments, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 935, 954
(1990) (contending that "[t]he whole point of the Reagan judicial appointment
campaign was that the federal judiciary had been filled with New Deal
Democrats who had turned American constitutional law into a branch of
liberal Democratic ideology and the courts into a production center of the
rights industry operated by a social democratic elite").
17 O'Connor Hearings, supra note 15, at 60-63, 79-81, 94-95, 120, 126-27,
146-49.
'
8 Id. at 85-86, 121-22.
'9 Id. at 69-70, 85, 120-21, 130-35, 151, 247.
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affirmative action.2' After repeated questioning, O'Connor did
briefly reveal her personal views on abortion21 and school
busing.22 She did so, however, only after stressing that her
personal views were irrelevant to her judicial decision-making.'
She also discussed the death penalty' and the exclusionary
rule, 2 5 but only in the context of her former roles as legislator
and trial court judge.
In refusing to answer questions regarding her ideology or
constitutional agenda, O'Connor stated,
I do not believe that as a nominee I can tellyou how I
might vote on a particular issue which may come before
the Court, or endorse or criticize specific Suprem[e]
Court decisions presenting issues which may well come
before the Court again. To do so would mean that I
have prejudged the matter or have morally committed
myself to a certain position. Such a statement by me
as to how I might resolve a particular issue or what I
might do in a future Court action might make it neces-
sary for me to disqualify myself on the matter. This
20 Id. at 148, 162-63.
21 Id. at 98 (stating her personal opposition to abortion "as a matter of
birth control or otherwise").
' Id. at 119 ("I just think that [mandatory busing of school children] is
not a system that often is terribly beneficial to the child").
' Id. at 60, 98, 119 (stressing that "the personal views and philosophies
•.. of a Supreme Court Justice and indeed any judge should be set aside...
in resolving matters that come before the Court" and reiterating that point in
each discussion).
Id. at 128 (O'Connor described her efforts as a legislator to develop a
constitutional death penalty statute in the wake of Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972).).
1 Id. at 146-47. Justice O'Connor gave her "simple observation as a trial
court judge" about the exclusionary rule that:
I cannot say that I think the application of Miranda has simply tied
the [officers'] hands to the extent that police work is ineffec-
tive .... I think the exclusionary rule, [however,] has proven to be
much more difficult in terms of the administration ofjustice. There
are times when perfectly relevant evidence and, indeed, sometimes
the only evidence in the case has been excluded by application of a
rule which, if different standards were applied maybe would not
have been applied in that situation, for instance, to good faith
conduct on the part of the police.
Id. at 146.
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would result in my inability to do my sworn duty;
namely, to decide cases that come before the Court.26
O'Connor based her refusal to answer questions about constitu-
tional law on her duty to decide cases impartially without
having prejudged the issues. O'Connor characterized herself
as a strict constructionist who would set aside personal values
and decide cases in accordance with the intent of the framers. 8
261 Id. at 57-58. O'Connor stated that she would answer all questions that
did not require her to evaluate either an actual past Supreme Court decision
or a hypothetical future one. Id.; see Rees, supra note 9, at 950-51 (explaining
that O'Connor was the first nominee "to maintain not only that it would be
improper to testify on constitutional questions at a confirmation hearing, but
that such testimony might give rise to a duty to disqualify herself in future
cases presenting issues discussed at the hearing"); cf Simson, supra note 10,
at 653-56 (commenting on the disqualification argument in the context of the
Thomas Confirmation Hearings).
O'Connor's rule against discussing questions that may come before the
Court excludes both answers to "result-oriented" questions and everything but
simplistic and vague statements about methods of constitutional analysis.
O'Connor Hearings, supra note 15, at 85, 134; see Rees, supra note 9, at 950
("To know that a prospective judge plans to examine legislative history" does
not tell a Senator how she intends to do that.).
O'Connor did indicate that she accepts several Supreme Court decisions
that she thought were unlikely to be seriously challenged. However, she
emphasized that when a Justice "becomes convinced in his or her own mind
that something was previously incorrectly resolved and that there are
sufficient reasons for reaching a contrary result," only then should he or she
should vote to reverse the earlier constitutional interpretation. O'Connor
Hearings, supra note 15, at 253; see Rees, supra note 9, at 920-21 (discussing
O'Connor's acceptance of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
restrictions or exceptions to the First Amendment in cases involving commer-
cial speech or obscenity, the prohibition of gender-based discrimination under
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the lack of a right to finding related to
abortion). Because O'Connor generally spoke quite briefly about the holdings
that she accepts, her discussion was not very conducive to discerning her
approach to constitutional questions. Id.; see O'Connor Hearings, supra note
15, at 102, 143, 151, and 160.
27 O'Connor Hearings, supra note 15, at 57-58. For criticism of her
position, see infra notes 223-225 and accompanying text.
' Id. at 68. No consensus exists about how to discern what the framers
of a constitutional provision meant by it. See Rees, supra note 9, at 935-36.
Additionally, many scholars and judges believe either that intent is not
discernable or that if it can be determined, it should not thwart our evolved
sense of justice and liberty. See Brennan's Speech, supra note 3; HAROLD J.
SPAETH & SAUL BRENNER, STUDIEs IN U.S. SUPREME COURT BEHAVIOR 221-49
(1990). Spaeth and Brenner contend that judicial restraint is "issue specific
.. [judges] defer to the judgment of the legislature (or other body) only when
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However, Justice O'Connor's pattern of adjudication reveals that
she came to the Court with specific ideas about changing the
law in the areas of Title VII and criminal defendants' rights. 9
As Grover Rees succinctly observed, "If anything was to be
gained by anybody as a result of Justice O'Connor's refusal to
discuss constitutional questions, it was not a less opinionated
judge for future litigants. '3
II. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
RIGHTS OF VICTIMS OF DISCRIMINATION
AND CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
Justice O'Connor's statements regarding greater federal
court deference to government officials during her Supreme
Court confirmation hearings masked a hostile approach toward
affirmative action and the rights of the accused, subjects she
evaded in her hearings. 1 Her votes and opinions in these areas
demonstrate that Reagan nominated her in part to implement
these aspects of his judicial agenda.
First, Justice O'Connor has repeatedly chosen to narrowly
construe Title VII's congressional mandates on equal opportuni-
ty.3 2  Specifically, she has limited affirmative action plans
designed to remedy both discriminatory intent and effect, 3 and
has similarly restricted the rights of criminal defendants.' The
Constitution provides an explicit inventory of rights designed to
guarantee fairness when the government acts to deprive those
accused of crimes of their liberty or their life. 5 In this area,
Justice O'Connor has shown a faithful deference to state courts
and law enforcement officials. 6 Justice O'Connor has urged
federal courts to deny review of convicted defendants' claims of
they approve of that judgment .... In short, judicial restraint is to judicial
decision making as phlogiston is to fire." Id. at 222.
2 See infra notes 39-202 and accompanying text.
8oRees, supra note 9, at 952.
See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 39-103 and accompanying text.
"3 See id.
See infra notes 109-202 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amends. IV-VI, VI; see, e.g., SHELDON GOLDMAN, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAw: CASES AND ESSAYs 643 (1987).
" See ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 336, 338.
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constitutional rights violations unless the constitutional errors
are "blatant."
3 7
A. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S APPROACH TO LIMIrING THE
DEFINITION OF, AND REMEDIES FOR, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
Paralleling the Reagan position on affirmative action,8
Justice O'Connor has consistently voted to limit voluntary and
court-ordered remedies for discrimination. This section exam-
ines the status of affirmative action before Sandra Day
O'Connor's appointment and the effect she has had in interpret-
ing Title VII amid the Reagan attack on civil rights.
1. Title VII Before Justice O'Connor's Appointment
Modern civil rights policy, which attempts to prevent
discrimination against members of disadvantaged groups, rests
upon the Court's dictum in United States v. Carolene Products
Co.39 that the Constitution demands strict scrutiny of classifica-
tions that disadvantage "discrete and insular minorities."' In
response to the civil rights movement, which protested the
actual discrimination and lack of equality pervasive in American
society, Congress enacted'the Civil Rights Act of 1964.41 Shortly
37 Id. at 336.
' Drew S. Days, III, Turning Back the Clock: The Reagan Administra-
tion and Civil Rights, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309, 318 (1984) [hereinafter
Turning Back the Clock] (discussing the Administration's early stand against
all but the most blatant forms of intentional discrimination).
39 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
4 Id. at 152 n.4; see Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in
the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982).
41 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. Section
703(a) of Title VII provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ......
Id. at 255 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988)).
This statute began a succession of federal laws aimed at eradicating
discrimination by both public and private actors in the areas of employment,
public accommodations, housing and education. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub.
L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988)); Fair Housing
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
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thereafter, civil rights enforcement theory embraced prohibi-
tions on both an intent to discriminate and discriminatory
effects.' The latter theory served to "shift the advantage of
time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its vic-
tims."' This view of civil rights emphasizes. the prevention of
discriminatory effects that disadvantage women of all colors and
members of racial minorities, rather than eradicating only those
effects rooted in discriminatory intent.
44
Not all of society embraced the dramatic reforms of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Senators Barry Goldwater and George
Bush, and California Governor Ronald Reagan, with many
southern politicians, vehemently opposed its passage.45 A very
restrictive view of the Act came out of this opposition: the Act
eliminated only blatant forms of intentional discrimination.46
The Court, on the other hand, held in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.47 that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits both
intentional discrimination by race or other prohibited
§§ 3601-3631 (1988)). Senator Hubert H. Humphrey explained that discrimi-
nation consisted of a difference in treatment, but neither he nor the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 specified whether that treatment had to be intentional.
See 110 CONG. REC. 5423 (1964).
42 See Days, supra note 4, at 1004 (tracing this development of a theory
of liability for discriminatory effect to The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to
1973bb-1 (1982)).
"' South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act); see also Days, supra note 4, at
1005 (discussing Katzenbach'and unintentional discrimination due to
"institutional arrangements").
" The discriminatory effect theory recognized that "discrimination flows
not only from individuals but also from certain institutional arrangements
which, whatever the motive for their establishment, disadvantage racial
minority group members and women." Days, supra note 4, at 1005.
41 SAVAGE, supra note 12, at 30-31.
4Shortly after Reagan and Bush took office as President and Vice-
President, the Administration strongly asserted the illegitimacy of disparate
impact litigation. See generally OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, REDEFINING DISCRIMINATION:
DISPARATE IMPACT AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
(1988). Compare Michael E. Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory,
Problems and Origin of the Advirse Impact Definition of Employment
Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429
(1985) with Alfred W. Blumrosen, Griggs was Correctly Decided - A Response
to Gold, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 443 (1986).
47 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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characteristics, and any employment practices that had a
"disparate" impact on racial minorities as demonstrated by
statistical disparities in workforce composition."8 The Court had
interpreted the Act to tolerate employment practices having a
disparate impact only when the employers could prove the
practices were job-related or justified by business necessity. 9
Critics of Griggs contend that Congress intended the 1964 Civil
Rights Act to include a discriminatory motive requirement.,
Another major development in civil rights enforcement
involved the availability of broad remedies for discriminatory
intent or effect.51 For example, the Court allowed for schemes
that required employers to meet goals for employing members of
minority groups.52 Additionally, some colleges, employers, and
government entities voluntarily adopted affirmative action
plans.
53
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,' Justice
Powell alone found that "[w]hen a classification denies an
individual opportunities or benefits enjoyed by others solely
because of his race or ethnic background, it must be regarded as
suspect."" Applying strict scrutiny, Justice Powell concluded
that only one purpose might be sufficient to justify the program,
the creation of a diverse student body, but he reasoned that the
4Id. at 431.
4' Days, supra note 4, at 1005-06; see Alfred E. Blumrosen, Strangers in
Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment
Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 89-90 (1972).
5 See Gold, supra note 46, at 489-513 (arguing that Griggs was wrongly
decided because Congress intended that courts consider motive in Title VII
cases).
51 See Days, supra note 4, at 1007.
52 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding a
federal law requiring state and local governments to employ minority business
enterprises on projects with federal funding); United Steel Workers of Am. v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (Title VII does not prohibit race-conscious affirma-
tive action plans). But see Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978) (allowing consideration of race in medical school admissions,
but rejecting quotas).
' Days, supra note 4, at 1007.
54 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
55 Id. at 305. Accordingly, Justice Powell asserted that race-based
affirmative action plans require the application of strict scrutiny, rejecting the
notion that the plan should be reviewed under a lesser standard because it
addressed discrimination against disadvantaged groups.
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University's method, a fixed number of spaces for minority
students, was not drawn narrowly enough.56 In contrast, four
Justices concluded that, under an intermediate review for
benign or remedial discrimination, the program should be
upheld because remedying the effects of societal discrimination
is a sufficiently important government purpose to justify the use
of a racial classification. 7
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, s a plurality of the Court upheld a
federal law59 which set aside at least 10 percent of the funds
received by contractors for minority business enterprise ("MBE")
subcontractors. °  The plurality endorsed neither an
intermediate nor strict scrutiny approach to such remedial
plans, but noted the "need for careful judicial evaluation" of
group conscious plans."
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and
Blackmun, contended that benign or remedial racial classifica-
tions should be subjected to an intermediate standard of re-
view. 62 Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented
and stated that the Constitution is "color blind" and any use of
racial classifications is therefore barred.63
The Reagan Administration, which considered only blatant,
intentional discrimination violative of the federal civil rights
laws or the Constitution, criticized the majority's approach to
civil rights enforcement and aggressively promoted profound
5 Id. at 311-12, 315. Although the Supreme Court struck down race-
conscious quotas in admissions plans, subsequent challenges to the use of race
as an admissions criterion have failed. Drew S. Days, III, Minority Access to
Higher Education in the Post-Bakke Era, 55 U. CoLO. L. REv. 491, 495-99
(1984).
57 438 U.S. at 359-69 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The remaining four justices voted
to invalidate the plan on statutory grounds. Id. at 421 (Stevens, J. concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
6 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
19 Public Works Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701, 6705-08, 6710 (1988).
448 U.S. at 453-54.
61 Id. at 491-92.
62 Id. at 517-20 (Marshall, J., concurring). Under such review, the
government interest in remedying the effects of past racial discrimination in
the construction industry would be sufficiently important to justify the use of
a racial classification.
63 Id. at 522 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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changes to this body of law." The Administration denigrated
discriminatory effect or disparate impact theories of litigation as
illegitimate and failed to faithfully execute civil rights laws.65
Justice O'Connor's votes and opinions reveal that from the very
beginning of her tenure, she had adopted this ideological view
that only individuals who prove that defendants intentionally
discriminated against them may benefit from Title VII.66
2. Justice O'Connor's Restrictive Interpretation of
Affirmative Action
During her confirmation hearings, Justice O'Connor refused
to comment on the meaning of Title VII because she did not
want to appear to have prejudged the issue.6" Yet, her votes
and opinions in this area show her strong agreement with
" Days, supra note 4, at 1008 ("Administration officials believed that a
legally wrong and politically wrongheaded shift had occurred in civil rights
enforcement in the late 1960s and the early 1970s and that this transforma-
tion required immediate correction." (footnote omitted)). See generally
Turning Back the Clock, supra note 38 (discussing inadequate enforcement of
civil rights laws by the Reagan Administration).
' See Turning Back the Clock, supra note 38, at 313.
6 See generally Rocco Potenza, Comment, Affirmative Action: Will
Justice O'Connor Author Its End?, 22 U. TOL. L. REv. 805 (1991). Justice
O'Connor, like the President who appointed her, frequently parroted Justice
John Marshall Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, that "[o]ur
Constitution is 'color-blind." Id at 833-34 (citing 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)). Potenza described Justice O'Connor's position as
"one of marginal equality because, except for the extremely limited circum-
stances where she finds the use of race justified, all government action
drawing racial distinctions is unconstitutional." Id. at 834; see also Turning
Back the Clock, supra note 38, at 319-30.
Justice O'Connor's approach is extremely formalistic and it fails to
provide any substantive meaning to the concept of equality contained in the
equal protection clause. Compare DAviD RAE ET AL., EQUALITIES 51 (1981).
Compare ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975) (contend-
ing that affirmative action "derogates the human dignity and individuality of
all to whom it is applied") with RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
227-29 (1978) (arguing that "affirmative action is consistent with individual
right to equal respect and concern").
Justice O'Connor's strict scrutiny approach infrequently provides for
deviation from the strict "color-blind" position; she finds such a deviation
constitutional only where the government is administering a narrowly
compensatory affirmative action program. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
" See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
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President Reagan's ideological view that disparate impact
analysis contradicts the appropriate focus on individualized,
intentional discrimination. 8  President Reagan's. agenda
included the view that Title VII prohibited the granting of
affimative action remedies designed to overcome patterns of
employment discrimination.69 Justice O'Connor's votes show
that she considers affimative action, whether voluntary or
court ordered, an illegitimate means of effectuating equality
because it constitutes intentional discrimination. 0 This section
briefly examines four areas of Justice O'Connor's decisions on
a rmative action: seniority systems, consent decrees, voluntary
plans, and defenses to discrimination claims. The subsequent
analysis will demonstrate that Justice O'Connor's agenda takes
a narrow view of what constitutes discrimination and the tools
permissible to remedy discrimination in employment.
a. Deference To Seniority Systems that Lock in
the Effects of Discrimination
Shortly afteir her appointment, Justice O'Connor joined the
majority in American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson" in holding that
seniority systems that locked in the ,effects of past
discrimination did not violate Title VII, even if they were
developed after the enactment of Title VII.72 In Firefighters
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts," Justice O'Connor wrote in her
concurring opinion that "Title VII affrmatively protects bona
fide seniority systems, including those with discriminatory
e See Days, supra note 4, at 1008 (discussing Reagan's agenda).
6 Cf. NoRMAN C. AMAKER, Cim RIGHTs AND THE RFAGAN ADiNISTRA-
TION 40-41, 126 (1988) (Assistant Attorney General Bradford Reynolds praised
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984),'as a "monu-
mental triumph for civil rights").
7oSee Potenza, supra note 66, at 833.
7'1 456 U.S. 63 (1982).
2 Id. at 67-68. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's
conclusion that "Congress intended the immunity accorded seniority systems
by § 703(h) to run only to those systems in existence at the time of its
effective date .... ." Patterson v./American Tobacco Co., 634 F.2d 744, 749
(4th Cir. 1980), vacated, 456 U.S. 63. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), the Court held that "an otherwise neutral,
legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply
because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination." Id. at 353-54.
7 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
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effects on minorities."'74 Additionally, in her majority opinion in
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC,75 she limited remedial compensation
to women denied work on the basis of gender because she found
that under Title VII the accused employer could limit future
liability by offering jobs without seniority to victims of
discrimination.76 Justice Blackmun argued that O'Connor's
deferential approach to employers was unnecessary and unfair,
and it effectively authorized employers to make "cheap offers" to
victims of discrimination, undermining their rights to full relief
from employment discrimination.77
b. Limitations on Consent Decrees to Remedy
Discrimination
Justice O'Connor further undermined Title VI's mandates
by placing limits on consent decrees to remedy discrimination.
In Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC,78 Justice O'Connor wrote a
separate opinion arguing that only under exceptional
circumstances may a court permit a race-conscious remedy that
benefits minorities who were not party to a previous finding of
discrimination.79 Furthermore, in United States v. Paradise,0 in
which the Court upheld a race-conscious consent decree as
justified by blatant, deliberate, and long-standing employment
discrimination,"' she disputed the necessity of a consent decree
that was not race neutral, despite the finding that the Alabama
74Id. at 587 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The court reversed a district
court order requiring the dismissal of white city employees, and not minority
employees, when the white employees had more seniority. Id. at 575.
75 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
76 Id. at 241.
7 Id. at 255 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
78 478 U.S. 421 (1986). Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens held that the legislative history does not indicate that Congress
intended that affirmative relief under § 706(g) of Title VII benefit only the
identified victims of past discrimination. Id. at 444-79 (Brennan, J.,
plurality).
79 Id. at 496 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). She
expressed concern, however, that the Court had disregarded the Stotts policy
that Title VII prevented such "non-victim" remedies. Id.
80 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
81Id.
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State Police had engaged in "pervasive, systematic, and
obstinate" exclusion of African Americans.
8 2
In these cases, Justice O'Connor's adjudication reveals her
strong agreement with the Reagan ideology against affirmative
action plans even when they are used to confront persistent,
blatant, and intentional discrimination. The Court's rulings
unilaterally notified over fify jurisdictions that their consent
decrees were illegal.8"
c. Limitations on Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,8" Justice
O'Connor cast the key vote and authored a concurring opinion
voiding a voluntary layoff plan that attempted to protect the
gains of an affirmative action plan. 5 In Wygant, the Court
struck down as unconstitutional a voluntary collective bar-
gaining agreement that required proportional layoffs of white
and minority teachers irrespective of seniority.8 6 The Court
disregarded the fact that the union and the school district
adopted this plan as a way to preserve the hiring of minority
teachers in compliance with an order of the Michigan Civil
Rights Commission.87 Justice O'Connor applied strict scrutiny
to invalidate the school board's interest in "providing minority
role models for its minority students, as an attempt to alleviate
the effects of societal discrimination."8 "
Similarly, in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,89 Justice
O'Connor ruled that a city minority set-aside program that
ensured minority business enterprises a fixed percentage of
82 Id. at 196 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
' See Days, supra note 4, at 1014.
84 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
a Id. at 284.
11 Id. at 271. The collective bargaining agreement required that teachers
with the least seniority be laid off first, except that the percentage of minority
teachers to be laid off could not exceed the percentage of minority teachers
currently employed. Id. at 270. Because most of the minority teachers were
recent hires, white teachers with greater seniority were laid off, while minori-
ty teachers with less seniority were retained. Id. at 271.
1171 at 297-98 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall contended
that the layoff provision was the only way the school board could have
preserved the success achieved through the minority hiring goals. Id. at 307.
8 Id. at 274.
89 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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public works or procurement contracts violated the Constitu-
tion.9" Like the Court in Wygant,9' the Croson Court asserted
that the Constitution does not allow the government to engage
in race-conscious employment or contracting schemes designed
to redress societal discrimination.9 2 The Reagan Administration
had vigorously argued for this result in its political and judicial
campaign to eliminate affirmative action plans.9" Justice
O'Connor succeeded in getting judicial sanction for the
proposition that the Constitution requires strict scrutiny review
of all race-conscious programs, regardless of whether the
classification is characterized as "benign" or "remedial."'"
o Id. Although the Court decided this case shortly after President Bush
took office, the Reagan Justice Department was heavily involved and aggres-
sively argued for the position that O'Connor ultimately took. See Days, supra
note 4, at 1015.
In Croson, the Court struck down the Minority Business Utilization Plan
("MBE") enacted by the city government of the former capital of the
Confederacy. This plan was extremely similar to the MBE plan upheld by the
Court in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 452 (1980) (The MBE plan in
Fullilove required 10% of any federal funds granted to state and local
governments to be expended employing MBEs.). Justice O'Connor distin-
guished the plurality's holding in Fullilove, which applied a deferential
approach, because the MBE provision there was enacted by Congress
pursuant to a specific constitutional grant of authority under section five of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Croson, 488 U.S. at 476. In contrast, Croson
involved a city action; therefore that local government, unlike Congress, lacks
constitutional authority to legislate in this area. Id. at 495. In June 1990,
the Court reaffirmed this more deferential approach to congressional
affirmative action plans. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997,
3009 (1990).
9 See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
92 488 U.S. at 488. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun voted to
uphold the set-aside. Id. at 556-57 n.12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
9 See Days, supra note 4, at 1015.
4 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94, 497. Applying strict scrutiny, O'Connor
found that the city had failed to demonstrate that it had a compelling interest
for implementing the Plan. Id. at 499. Justice Marshall harshly criticized
this approach to affirmative action:
In concluding that remedial classifications warrant no different
standard of review under the Constitution than the most brute and
repugnant forms of state-sponsored racism, a majority of this Court
signals that it regards racial discrimination as largely a phenome-
non of the past, and that government bodies need no longer
preoccupy themselves with rectifying racial injustice.
Id. at 551-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor's approach reflects the ideological perspective, advocat-
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By rejecting affirmative action plans based on an
acknowledgement of societal discrimination as "too amorphous
a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy,"95 Justice
O'Connor helped to elevate the interests of "innocent" benefi-
ciaries of discrimination over the interests of innocent victims of
societal discrimination.96 A key component of the Reagan
agenda on civil rights involved the prohibition of race-conscious
hiring, promotion, retention, and contracting programs.97 In
Wygant, Justice O'Connor joined a decision and rationale
consistent with this ideological rejection of benevolent efforts to
eradicate the effects of the undeniably discriminatory
ed by conservatives, that requires strict scrutiny whenever race is used in
decision-making. See Days, supra note 4, at 1015. Justice O'Connor's view
paralleled Justice Powell's analysis that requires strict scrutiny regardless of
the race benefitted by the government program. See Regents of the Univ. of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 235, 288-90 (1978). While Justice O'Connor
substantially aided this agenda, she did not hold that the Constitution
entirely prohibited minority set-aside programs. In Sheet Metal Workers v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986), she suggested that "(iln the extreme case, some
form of narrowly tailored racial preference might be necessary to break down
patterns of deliberate exclusion." Croson, 488 U.S. at 509; see Michael
Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning
of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 1735-45 (1989). For a
discussion of Sheet Metal Workers, see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying
text.
5 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276. Justice O'Connor joined the plurality
opinion, which reasoned that even if the school board had a compelling
interest, the layoff provision was unconstitutional because the means of
achieving this goal were not narrowly tailored to the asserted interest. Id. at
283-84.
9 Id. at 281 (The governmental body must demonstrate a compelling
interest justifying the use of a racial classification before "innocent persons
may be called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy."). Thus, this
opinion contended that in this case, unlike in cases involving hiring goals that
diffuse the burden on society generally, the layoff provision was overburden-
some in that it "impose[ld] the entire burden of achieving racial equality on
particular individuals." Id, at 283.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall voted to uphold the plan
under intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 303-06. Justice Marshall rejected the
plurality position that the plan was unduly burdensome because "someone will
lose a job under any layoff plan and, whoever it is, that person will not
deserve it." Id. at 307.
9 7 See Robert E. Taylor, Civil Rights Division Head Will Seek Supreme
Court Ban on Affirmative Action, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1981, at 4 (Assistant
Attorney General Bradford Reynolds seeking to prohibit voluntary
race-conscious hiring and promotion programs as inconsistent with Title VII).
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environment pervasive in American society. In Croson, she
helped to move the Court toward the Reagan agenda of allowing
remedies only for intentional discrimination and only for those
individuals who the courts have recognized as victims of
discrimination.
d. Expansion of Employer Defenses to Title VII Actions
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,9 s Justice O'Connor
took a narrow view of equal rights and the utility of statistics in
meeting the burden of proof in discrimination cases. Wards
Cove restricted the eighteen-year-old Griggs precedent that
required an employer to show that employment tests were
"demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance."99
Instead, Wards Cove allowed employers to meet the easier
defense to statistical disparity of "legitimate business interest,"
while also requiring the plaintiffs to maintain the burden of
persuasion.' ° Thus, Justice O'Connor joined an opinion that
significantly curtailed the prospect of plaintiffs winning
disparate impact discrimination cases.
Congress strongly disagreed with this parsimonious treat-
ment of the important disparate impact line of cases.' After
vetoes by President Bush, Congress finally amended Title VII to
restore and strengthen civil rights laws that ban discrimination
in employment, repudiating the Wards Cove decision.0 2 Thus,
five members of the Court, the President, and twenty-five
members of the Senate almost thwarted the will of the majority
of citizens regarding the need for remedies for both
discriminatory intent and effect. The difficulty Congress faced
in President Bush's ideological opposition to restoring Title VII
shows the potentially devastating impact of Senate acquiescence
s 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,436 (1971); see supra notes 47-
49 and accompanying text.
1oo 490 U.S. at 659.
101 In response to the undermining of Title VII precedents by the
Rehnquist Court civil rights decisions of 1989, Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1990. 136 CONG. REc. H9552 (1990). After President Bush's
veto in October 1990, the Senate failed to override that veto by one vote.
THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS AND LEGISLATION 7 (1991).
102 See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105, 42 U.S.C.A § 2000e-2(k)(I) (West
Supp. 1992); Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Less Discriminatory
Alternatives in Disparate Impact Litigation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1621, 1623
(1993).
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to the appointment of Supreme Court nominees who may share
their nominator's ideological agenda.
3. Summary
Justice O'Connor's Title VII decisions reveal a distinct
ideological perspective favoring the claims of "innocent" white
males over the equality interests of innocent victims of dis-
criminatory intent or effect. Justice O'Connor has zealously
protected seniority systems that perpetuate the effects of past
discrimination, has prohibited afirmative plans, and has
deferred to employer defenses to discrimination claims. Justice
O'Connor's formalistic approach to equality fails to consider the
substantive and social inequalities present between the classes
affected by such programs.' Because of Justice O'Connor's re-
interpretation of the mandates of Title VII, precedents now
reflect the Reagan judicial agenda. Thus, despite denials during
her confirmation hearings, Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence
reveals her sympathy for curtailing the application of civil
rights laws.
B. JUSTICE O'CoNNoR's NARROWING OF THE RIGHTS OF
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
Analysis of Justice O'Connor's votes and opinions involving
the rights of criminal defendants demonstrates her juris-
prudential consistency with President Reagan's hostility toward
the rights of criminal defendants. During her confirmation
hearings she declared herself judicially neutral in interpreting
such laws.' In criminal cases, Justice O'Connor has supported
" Justice Marshall criticized O'Connor's holding in Croson that
Richmond had inadequate findings to conclude that there was prior discrimi-
nation in its construction industry. 488 U.S. at 539-48 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). He characterized the majority's analysis as "exceedingly myopic."
Id. at 530 (Justice Marshall objected to the majority's analyzing each piece of
evidence as if it existed in a vacuum rather than as a whole.). Id. at 551-52.
See Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88
MICH. L. REv. 641, 693 (1990) (arguing that any evaluation of affirmative
action programs must take into consideration the condition of race relations,
the equality of opportunities available to minorities, and whether such
programs are a means of eventually achieving a color-blind society).
104 See supra notes 15-27 (discussing O'Connor's assertion of construction-
ism - interpretivism or analysis of the Constitution based on the Framers'
intent - and federalism).
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the independence of law enforcement officers over the
constitutional precedents protecting criminal defendants.
Perhaps some Senators who voted to confirm Justice O'Connor
would have agreed with her perspective that the state interest
in law and order outweighed then-existing doctrine protecting
the rights of criminal defendants. 0 5  However, Justice
O'Connor's assertions of neutrality circumvented any mean-
ingful dialogue in the Senate or in the public about her hostility
toward these precedents. This section examines three
substantive areas of the rights of criminal defendants that
reveal Justice O'Connor's unstated law-and-order agenda:
habeas corpus, right to counsel, and the imposition of the death
penalty.
1. Justice O'Connor's Restrictions on the Availability of
Habeas Corpus Relief
The Reagan Administration asserted that "there is no
justification in the present day for the availability of federal
habeas corpus as a routine means of review of state criminal
convictions.' ' 6  President Reagan's proposed Habeas Corpus
Reform Act included the denial of habeas relief if a court finds
that a claim was fully and fairly adjudicated in state
proceedings, deferring broadly to the factual findings or mixed
fact and law conclusions of state courts, and mandating forfei-
tures of rights due to procedural default (through restrictions on
second habeas petitions and on retroactivity rights claims, in
addition to amplification of the adequate-state-ground doc-
trine).' 7 Justice O'Connor's votes and opinions on federal
105 O'Connor thwarted the Confirmation process by denying the existence
of the ideological perspective that she, like all justices, obviously possesses.
Still, had the Senate Judiciary Committee known more about her ideology,
they probably would have confirmed her anyway. See Rees, supra note 9, at
940 (observing that the "absence of liberal opposition to Justice O'Connor was
surely due in part to the calculation that she was the best Reagan nominee
they could have hoped for") (citation omitted).
06 The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearings on S. 2216 Before
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1982) [hereinafter
Reform Act] (quoting a letter from William French Smith, U.S. Attorney Gen.,
to George Bush, President of the Senate (Mar. 3, 1982)).
10 Larry W. Yackle, The Reagan Administration's Habeas Corpus
Proposal, 68 IOWA L. REV. 609, 611-14 (1983) (thorough examination and
critique of the Reagan Administration proposal to severely undercut the
availability of habeas corpus relief, discussing S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
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review of criminal convictions have significantly furthered
President Reagan's agenda of restricting the success and
availability of habeas corpus relief."' 8 This section examines the
status of habeas corpus review before Justice O'Connor's
appointment and how she has actively participated in judicial
"reform" of this remedy.
a. Historical Background of Habeas Corpus
The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of
habeas corpus unless it is suspended due to national security." 9
The Reconstruction Congress passed the Habeas Corpus Act
immediately following the Civil War."0 This Act extended the
protections of the writ of habeas corpus to inmates in state
prisons so they would have a guaranteed civil right to seek
justice in a federal court."' During the time of the
(1982)). Yackle observed that:
The explanation for the Administration's assault on the postconvic-
tion writ resides deep within an ideological tradition that subordi-
nates the long-standing function of the federal courts in the enforce-
ment of constitutional safeguards to values touching federalism and
the finality of criminal judgments .... The Administration would
dismantle, to a large extent, the federal machinery now in place for
the federal effectuation of the Bill of Rights and its analogue, the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 666. Yackle concluded that these proposed reforms of habeas corpus
reflect a reactionary conservative ideology aimed at restricting the federal
court's opportunities to effectuate constitutional guarantees, a process that
began in earnest after President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed a majority
of the Supreme Court in the late 1930s. Id. at 612.
108 While Congress rejected President Reagan's legislative proposals, the
Court transformed some of them into law. See infra notes 119-157 and
accompanying text.
109 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it." Federal habeas corpus is based upon one of the
most ancient writs in the Anglo-American legal tradition. See generally
LARRY W. YACKLE, POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES § 4 (1981) [hereinafter POST-
CONvICTION REMEDIES] (describing the history and status of habeas corpus
jurisprudence).
10 Habeas Corpus Act, Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
"' See 1 JAMES S. LIEBMAN, HABEAS CORPUS AND THE PENALTY OF DEATH:
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUs PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.2, at 14 (1988)
(discussing the prejudicial environment prior to and following the civil war
and its effect on civil rights).
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Reconstruction Amendments and Civil Rights Acts, "it was clear
to Congress that the fundamental federal rights... would be
meaningless absent appropriate mechanisms for their
enforcement."112 Accordingly, habeas corpus provided inmates
the right to petition a federal judge to hear their pleas that
their rights under the Constitution had been violated."' The
writ allowed a federal judge to unconditionally discharge
prisoners from custody upon a finding that the state had
obtained a conviction or sentence through a constitutional
violation. 114
The availability of federal habeas corpus as a postcon-
viction remedy for constitutional error is of preeminent
significance as a demonstration of this civilization's
commitment to the maintenance of individual liberty
against the incursions of governmental power." 5
For nearly a century, the writ of habeas corpus provided "the
most important way for a state prisoner to vindicate his federal
constitutional rights.""' 6 Prior to Justice O'Connor's appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court, a habeas corpus petitioner could
obtain review of his federal constitutional claims in a federal
'
12 Id. § 2.2, at 8 n.10.
113 See id. § 8.1, at 85.
114 See id. § 8.5, at 108.
115 POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES, supra note 109, § 87, at 354. Thirty
years ago, the Supreme Court noted that the framers of our Constitution
recognized the necessity of habeas corpus to protect the individual in "the
unceasing contest between personal liberty and government oppression." Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400-01 (1963) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 129 (R. Welsh ed., 1900)). In 1973 the Court reaffirmed the
important role of habeas corpus, stating that the writ is "available to effect
discharge from any confinement contrary to the Constitution or fundamental
law ...." Presier v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); see BURNS, supra note 1,
at 139-40.
11 Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, Judicial Activism and Legislative
"Reform" of Federal Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis of Recent Develop-
ments and Current Proposals, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1, 4 (1991). See generally
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution,
32 B.U. L. REv. 143 (1952) (arguing that habeas corpus is that most important
right). Habeas corpus helps to guarantee the rights of an American citizen
under the Constitution by protecting criminal defendants from abuses or
errors in the exercise of authority by state courts and law enforcement.
BURNS, supra note 1, at 139.
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court unless he had deliberately waived those claims. 7 A
petitioner could also return to the federal courts following the
denial of the initial habeas corpus petition if he wished to
present additional facts or theories for relief."
8
b. Justice O'Connor's Curtailment of Habeas Corpus
Review
During Justice O'Connor's confirmation hearings, she did
not reveal her views on the need to restrict the availability of
habeas corpus relief. 9 However, Justice O'Connor has helped
to curtail the availability of habeas corpus review to such an
extent that many now consider the writ an ineffective tool for
redress of constitutional violations.2
Through a series of decisions rendering habeas corpus more
complex and more unfair to criminal defendants, Justice
O'Connor has aided in the deconstruction of the writ.'2' These
decisions have "greatly undermined the ability of federal courts
to issue the writ of habeas corpus ... "122 Specifically, Justice
... See Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 19.
n1 Id. at 23-24 (discussing under what grounds a prisoner may bring
successor habeas petitions); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1962)
(outlining basic rules on successor habeas petitions).
..
9 See O'Connor Hearings, supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
12 See, e.g., Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 7; see also James S.
Liebman, Challenging the Death Penalty: A Colloquium More Than "Slightly
Retro:" The Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague
v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 537 (1990/1991); Bruce Ledewitz,
Habeas Corpus as a Safety Valve for Innocence, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 415 (1990/1991); Steven M. Goldstein, Chipping Away at the Great
Writ: Will Death Sentenced Federal Habeas Corpus Petitioners Be Able to
Seek and Utilize Changes in the Law?, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357
(1990/1991); Karl N. Metzner, Note, Retroactivity, Habeas Corpus, and the
Death Penalty: An Unholy Alliance, 41 DuKE L.J. 160 (1991); Yale L.
Rosenberg, Constricting Federal Habeas Corpus: From Great Writ to Excep-
tional Remedy, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 597 (1985).
"
2 Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 53-55. Some of these decisions
were made upon issues not argued by the parties. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S.
914, 923 (1984) (O'Connor gave advice to federal trial judges on collateral
esteppel, and other avenues to avoid hearing habeas petitions, even though
the question had not been raised or briefed.); McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct.
1454, 1477 (1991) ("Indeed, the new rule announced and applied today was
not even requested by respondent at any point in this litigation.") (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
' Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 7.
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O'Connor has "interpreted" a severe restriction on the raising of
claims of constitutional violations via more than one habeas
corpus petition. She has required that petitioners exhaust all
state remedies prior to application to the federal courts. She
has also required defendants to show actual, rather than
potential, prejudice before they may obtain relief. This section
discusses how these judicially enacted reforms of habeas corpus
have eliminated the effectiveness of the writ of habeas corpus
for many inmates.'"
i. Justice O'Connor's Application of a Total Exhaustion
Rule and Limitation of Successive Habeas Corpus
Petitions
Justice O'Connor began to restrict habeas corpus early in
her tenure. In Rose v. Lundy,"2 Justice O'Connor interpreted
habeas corpus to require a federal judge to dismiss an entire
petition for habeas corpus relief if it contained any unexhausted
state claims.125 This total exhaustion rule significantly limited
the availability of federal relief for convictions obtained in
violation of the rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution.'
This total exhaustion rule fails to harmonize with the language
Another area in which Justice O'Connor's votes have restricted habeas
corpus is in the imposition of a retroactivity test limiting the jurisdiction of
federal courts. The evaluation of this complicated doctrine is beyond the scope
of this Article. See generally id. at 42-50 (explaining that this use of a
retroactivity test reflects the Rehnquist Era ideology "that habeas is not
principally a means of protecting an individual's constitutional rights, but is
rather a deterrent against 'bad faith' decisions by state courts," ignoring that
habeas historically provided individuals a means of obtaining relief against
the government's violations of the Bill of Rights) (emphasis in original). The
dissenters in Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 1051 (1990), led by Justice Marshall,
criticized these judicial modifications, stating that "the Court... simply
elevates its preference for finality in state proceedings over Congress'
commitment 'to provide a federal forum for state prisoners ... by extending
the habeas corpus powers of the federal courts to their constitutional
maximum.' This raw preference for finality is unjustified." Id. at 1059
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963)).
" Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 5 ("This judicial legislation has
made habeas corpus - once a straightforward legal remedy - into an
immensely complex morass of procedural rules and legal obstacles.").
124 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
" Id. at 522. Thus every federal constitutional claim of a defendant was
not cognizable on its merits as a result of Justice O'Connor's rule.
126 See Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 65-66.
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and intent of the habeas corpus statute, and demonstrates
Justice O'Connor's failure to follow her assertions of a
philosophy of judicial restraint.'
During her tenure on the Court, Justice O'Connor has
supported Justice Rehnquist's argument that because federal
courts spend too much time on state death penalty cases, the
Court should limit federal jurisdiction over such cases.M Both
Justices publicly supported Republican efforts to further curb
the writ, and after Congress repudiated their efforts, the Court
"interpreted" new restrictions on the availability of habeas
corpus relief.29
The Court in McCleskey v. Zant,130 joined by Justice
O'Connor, ignored the language and intent of the habeas statute
and implemented a new statute of limitations. The Court held
that by failing to include all of his claims in one petition, the
petitioner was barred from filing further claims.'' The Court
reasoned that because McCleskey had not shown "cause" for his
failure to raise the claim in his earlier petition, the Court's
refusal to allow federal courts to address the merits of this
capital defendant's claim did not result in a miscarriage of
'27See id. at 66.
'28 See id. (discussing these modifications of the writ in the context of
Chief Justice Rehnquist's effect on the doctrine). Justice O'Connor has acted
in synchronicity with Rehnquist to undermine the writ of habeas corpus. The
Court handed down only a few significant restrictions of habeas corpus
between Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor's appointments, most
importantly Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). In Stone, Rehnquist held
that federal courts could no longer consider habeas claims under the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule if the prisoner had been given a "full and fair"
opportunity to litigate the claim in the state courts. Id. at 494. This removed
a major area of constitutional law from the jurisdiction of federal courts,
despite the principle that federal courts should have the final say on matters
of federal law.
"' See infra notes 151-157 and accompanying text; Tabak & Lane, supra
note 116, at 55 (arguing that the habeas system legislated by the Rehnquist
Era Court has greatly taxed judicial resources by imposing complex proce-
dural requirements).
130 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
131 Id. at 1474; see McCleskey v. Kemp, No. C87-1517A (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23,
1987) (the state had "planted" a jailhouse informant to deliberately elicit
inculpatory admissions from McCleskey in violation of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. The district court determined that McCleskey had not
known about these violations when he filed his first federal petition, and that
his failure to discover this evidence earlier was not the result of "inexcusable
neglect"). McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1460.
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justice. 3 2 The Court criticized the "significant costs of habeas
corpus review," including the disrespect for the finality of state
criminal convictions that multiple habeas petitions cause, the
"heavy burden on scarce federal judicial resources," and the
system's "disincentives to present claims when evidence is
fresh.' 13  The Court stated that permitting more than one
habeas corpus petition amplifies these costs because "[p]erpetual
disrespect for the finality of convictions disparages the entire
criminal justice system.' ' 3 '
In McCleskey, Justice O'Connor participated in a major
decision that "accomplished much of what Chief Justice
Rehnquist tried to do the previous year in a personal campaign
to persuade Congress to amend the habeas corpus statute."'3 5
The dissenters roundly criticized the conservative activism
apparent in the decision:
Today's decision departs drastically from the norms
that inform the proper judicial function. Without even
the most casual admission that it is discarding
longstanding legal principles, the Court radically
redefines the content of the "abuse of the writ" doctrine,
substituting the strict-liability "cause and prejudice"
standard of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977),
for the good-faith "deliberate abandonment" standard of
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963)...
[ignoring that the] very essence of the Great Writ is our
criminal justice system's commitment to suspending
"[c]onventional notions of finality of litigation.., where
life or liberty is at stake and infringement of
constitutional rights is alleged.'
' 36
13 1 Id. at 1472-75.
"
33 Id. at 1469; see Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 85.
134 ill S. Ct. at 1469. This list of "costs" does not include the actual cost
of the deprivation of the life or liberty of a person in violation of his constitu-
tional rights because of judicially interpreted procedural bars against
considering the merits of such claims.
"a Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Puts Sharp Curbs on Repeated
Death-Row Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 1991, at Al, A18 ("[His] legislative
effort failed after meeting resistance both from senior Federal judges and from
Democratic leaders in Congress.").
136 Ill S. Ct. at 1477-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Habeas corpus
scholars Ronald Tabak and Mark Lane criticize this decision as "yet another
instance of radical judicial lawmaking by the Rehnquist Era Court." Tabak &
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Contrary to her confirmation statements about original intent
and judicial restraint, Justice O'Connor joined a Court opinion
that ignored the language and intent of the habeas statute and
ignored Congress' rejection of this revision of habeas corpus.' 7
Her advocacy of stringent limits on habeas corpus claims
reveals that she came to the court with an ideological
perspective that she hid from the Senate. The McCleskey
restriction on successive habeas corpus petitions, when
combined with the Rose rule, increases the likelihood that a
prisoner, usually acting pro se, 3' will default on his substantive
claim of violations of his constitutional rights.'
Habeas corpus expert Larry Yackle predicted the deleteri-
ous effect of such a combination shortly after Justice O'Connor's
1982 decision:
The Supreme Court's unfortunate embrasure of the
"total exhaustion" rule in Rose v. Lundy makes the very
idea of a statute of limitations untenable. The district
courts have now been instructed to dismiss entirely
petitions raising more than one claim if any has not yet
been put to the state courts.... Combined with a
statute of limitations, the "total exhaustion" rule would
cause enormous difficulty for litigants attempting in
good faith to follow prescribed procedures .... The
likely result, should [Rose v. Lundy] be joined by a
statute of limitations, could only be the coerced
forfeiture of "unexhausted" claims in all too many
cases .... Currently "unexhausted" claims threaten to
delay the presentation of claims already "exhausted"
Lane, supra note 116, at 6.
"It is axiomatic that this Court does not function as a backup
legislature for the reconsideration of failed attempts to amend existing
statutes." 111 S. Ct. at 1489 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Most habeas litigation involves undereducated prison inmates
proceeding pro se. The Court's rule unreasonably imposes procedural traps
for these advocates who lack professional training. See infra notes 169-178
and accompanying text discussing the right to counsel. See generally PAUL
RoBINsON, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF
STATE COURT JuDGMENTS (1979) (examining habeas corpus and finding that
time is required to marshall precise arguments on federal issues because the
nature of collateral claims means that they often come to a litigant's attention
well after judgment).
39 See Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 60.
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beyond the period permitted by [a proposed timelimitation].'
Thus by creating a total exhaustion rule and a statute-like
limitation on the ability to bring a second habeas corpus
petition, Justice O'Connor helped to effectuate the Reagan
judicial agenda that sought to substantially diminish the
availability of habeas corpus to remedy constitutional violations.
ii. Justice O'Connor's Imposition of a Higher Burden of
Actual Prejudice in Habeas Corpus
Justice O'Connor's decisions also coincided with the Reagan
agenda of strongly limiting the availability of habeas corpus
relief by imposing an "actual prejudice" rule. 4' The Court in
United States v. Frady'42 held that if a petitioner cannot show,
for instance, that jury instructions had resulted in actual
prejudice, then cause does not exist for collateral review of his
conviction or sentence."' The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure require a mere showing of plain error for collateral
review,' but Justice O'Connor's majority opinion described the
lower burden of the federal "plain error" rule is "out of place" in
habeas corpus proceedings, even though the Habeas Corpus Act
does not mention or imply an actual prejudice standard."
Frady limited federal courts' ability to address habeas
'4° Yackle, supra note 107, at 621-22 n.70 (1983) (adding that "[one
hardly must be a devotee of habeas corpus to recognize that inconsistent
procedural requirements may constitute due process violations").
In the simplest illustration, a prisoner may have two federal claims,
only one of which has been put to the state courts. A statute of
limitations would require the presentation of the "exhausted" claim
as soon as possible .... The Lundy rule, on the other hand, sends
just the opposite signal, instructing the petitioner intentionally to
withhold the "exhausted' claim so that it can be presented together
with the currently "unexhausted" claim - that is after the latter
has been taken to state court.
Id.
'
4 1 See Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 37 (discussing the effect on
habeas corpus of the "actual prejudice" rule stated in the pre-O'Connor case of
Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)).
'42 456 U.S. 152, 167 (1982).
'43 Id. at 168.
14' FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
145Frady, 456 U.S. at 164.
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petitioners' claims on the merits, because without a showing of
actual prejudice to the defendant, the federal court must
consider the error harmless.' Thus, Justice O'Connor reduced
the constitutional protection given to criminal defendants by
limiting opportunities to raise claims of violations of federal
constitutional guarantees.14
The implementation of Justice O'Connor's. ideological
agenda has resulted in the executions of several people whose
trials included "egregious" constitutional errors.' Death
penalty experts Tabak and Lane clarified the important role of
habeas corpus in protecting the guarantees of the, Bill of Rights
when they noted that:
Most death-sentenced inmates with valid federal
constitutional claims have received relief on -those
claims, if at all, only when they have reached-the
federal courts. Indeed, state death penalty proceedings
have been so frequently flawed by constitutional error
that has not been corrected on appeal or in state
.collateral proceedings that about forty percent of all
state court capital judgments have been reversed by the
' Prior to O'Connor's appointment to the Court, the federal courts were
usually able to reach the merits of a petitioner's claims easily and grant relief
for meritorious constitutional claims, except when the harmless error doctrine
applied. See Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 28. '
The Supreme Court's harmless error doctrine has distinguished two
general categories of constitutional rights: those for which the violation
requires automatic reversal and those for which the violation requires reversal
unless the error can be shown to have been harmless. See Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-24 (1967). Accordingly, O'Connor's imposition of
an actual prejudice requirement on habeas corpus petitions not only raises the
burden of proof but also effectively shifts it to the petitioner. For an examina-
tion of the Reagan Administration's attempts to modify the harmless error
doctrine, see Yackle, supra note 107.
147 See SAVAGE, supra note 12, at 226.
148 See Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and
Capricious Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 797, 840-42 (1986) (detailing one case in which a state procedur-
al habeas bar resulted in an execution of one defendant while another,
virtually identical defendant in the same crime received a life sentence, Smith
v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983), and one
case in which an execution took place after the Eleventh Circuit refused to
hear a second habeas corpus petition including an affidavit from the then
disbarred trial attorney who admitted to having been on drugs during the
trial, Young v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 514 (11th Cir. 1985)).
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federal courts. This has occurred despite the
presumption of correctness given to state court findings
of fact .... Thus, habeas corpus is tremendously
important in our constitutional system, and is the
predominant means of correcting constitutional error in
state capital cases. 49
The constitutional-error rate for death penalty cases has risen
significantly since 1981.150 Justice O'Connor has played a key
149 Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 11 (adding that this has occurred
"despite overly restrictive procedural bars developed by the Supreme Court
that preclude consideration of meritorious claims in a great many cases").
Several explanations exist for the high rate of constitutional error in
state criminal proceedings. Perhaps the more politically oriented and
parochial state courts are prone to allowing the occurrence of serious constitu-
tional errors because of the unfamiliarity of many state court judges with
federal constitutional jurisprudence, including Eighth Amendment require-
ments. Id. at 14-15.
Some state court judges have strongly supported federal review in
criminal cases through habeas corpus. Utah Supreme Court Justice Christine
M. Durham acknowledged her deep respect for the role of state courts but
added that she "welcome[s] and rel[ies] upon the availability of federal habeas
review of criminal cases .... [because] the state courts lack the fundamental
resources necessary to ensure full and fair representation of all criminal
defendants." Hearings on Habeas Corpus Issues Before the Subcommittee on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 433-34 (1991) [hereinafterHabeas Corpus Hearings] (prepared
statement of Christine Durham, Assoc. Justice, Utah Sup. Ct.).
Tabak and Lane conclude that the electoral vulnerability of some state
court judges affected their deference to constitutional guarantees:
Another apparent reason for constitutional errors by state courts in
death penalty cases is that these cases often subject judges to
intense political scrutiny, more so than any other type of legal
proceeding. In states where members of the judiciary stand for
election, or for reconfirmation by the voters, a judge's voting record
in capital cases can decide the election. As Justice Durham has
stated, "[tihere is therefore a structural vulnerability in the state
court systems" to pressures that "are sometimes antithetical to
federal constitutional guarantees." Indeed.... if a state judge
provides relief in a death penalty case "he will not only forfeit his
judgeship, but will quite possibly lose any chance to practice law in
that community."
Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 15-16 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in
original).
150 Habeas Corpus Hearings, supra note 149, at 507 (Memorandum from
James Liebman to Sen. Joseph Biden (July 15, 1991)) (reporting on recent
American Bar Association findings that while the constitutional-error rate for
federal courts overall between 1976 and 1991 was 40%, the error rate for the
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role in restricting the federal courts from ruling on the merits of
a criminal defendant's claims that the state violated the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
Despite the obstructions to habeas corpus relief interpreted
by the Court since Justice O'Connor's appointment, the Bush
Administration sought to further restrict the availability of the
writ in 1991.151 The Bush anti-crime bill included a series of
amendments to the federal habeas corpus statute that would
have virtually abolished federal habeas jurisdiction. The Bush
Administration proposal included and expanded on the
recommendations of the Powell Committee, which Chief Justice
Rehnquist had formed. Perhaps the most significant aspect of
the ideological cohesion between members of the Court and the
executive branch concerned the advocacy of the elimination of
the authority of federal courts to overturn a state conviction or
sentence on any grounds which had been "fully and fairly
adjudicated in State proceedings.' 15 2
This amendment sought to establish a strict Stone v.
Powell5 standard for reviewing all federal constitutional claims
in federal habeas corpus proceedings. In Stone, Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion carved out a substantial exception
to the availability of habeas corpus relief by holding that federal
courts could not entertain claims invoking the exclusionary rule
for violations of the Fourth Amendment if there had been a "full
and fair" adjudication of those claims in the state court."M
Because the full and fair adjudication standard does not ensure
a just determination of an alleged rights violation, the Bush
proposal to expand this harsh doctrine would have
disempowered the federal courts from examining the merits of
constitutional claims. Given that since 1971 federal courts have
reversed convictions due to erroneous state court holdings in
six circuits reviewing death sentences since 1981 was over 50%).
.
51 See Proposed Death Penalty Litigation Procedures Act of 1991 § 2258,
reprinted at 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S3200 (daily ed. Mar. 13,
* 1991); Proposed Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1991, reprinted at 137 CONG.
REc. S8823-25 (daily ed. June 27, 1991).
112 Proposed Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1991 § 2254(d), reprinted at
137 CONG. REc. S8823-25 (daily ed. June 27, 1991).
'53 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).
154 Id.
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approximately 40 percent of capital cases,'55 this was indeed a
striking proposal.
Contemporaneous with the Bush proposal, Justice O'Connor
spoke in favor of severe restrictions on the availability of habeas
corpus relief because, in her view, federalism demands that
federal courts respect state court convictions.' 56 Thus, Justice
O'Connor deems the need for finality in state court proceedings
as greater than the need for relief from convictions based upon
violations of the rights of those accused of crimes. Congress
rejected such a balancing approach in its refusal to adopt any
variation of the Bush proposals that had sought to effectively
abolish habeas corpus. 57 Considering Congress' refusal to adopt
Reagan and Bush proposals limiting habeas corpus in these
ways, these decisions reveal Justice O'Connor's ideological
predisposition to contravene text, intent, and separation of
powers to accomplish conservative reform of constitutional law.
2. Justice O'Connor's Restrictions on the Meaning of
Right to Counsel
Justice O'Connor's votes and opinions on the scope of the
constitutionally-guaranteed right to counsel parallel her
restrictive interpretation of habeas corpus. She has helped to
effectuate the Reagan agenda of limiting the availability and
meaning of the right to state-paid counsel for criminal
defendants. This subsection discusses the status of the right to
155 Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 11.
156 See id. at 5 n.6 (citing Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Address at the
Attorney General's Crime Summit (Mar. 4, 1991)). Justice O'Connor's views
were similar to Chief Justice Rebnquist's in this area. In speeches, Chief
Justice Rehnquist has frequently called for reform of habeas corpus, complain-
ing that federal courts exercise too much review over state criminal proceed-
ings and that, consequently, state death sentences were delayed too fre-
quently. Id. (discussing Coyle et al., Rehnquist is Still Hoping for Habeas
'Reform,' NATL. L.J., Jan. 14, 1991, at 5; Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist,
Remarks at the American Law Institute Annual Meeting (May 15, 1990)
(unpublished transcript, on file with the Albany Law Review); Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the American Bar Association Mid-year
Meeting (Feb. 6, 1989); Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the
National Conference of Chief Justices (Jan. 27, 1988)).
157 On October 17, 1991 members of the House of Representatives voted
218-208 against the Bush habeas corpus proposals. Tabak & Lane, supra note
116, at 93.
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counsel before Justice O'Connor's confirmationand explores the
effects of her decisions in this area.
a. The Right to Counsel Prior to Justice O'Connor
The Constitution provides that "[i]n all- criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall ... have the assistance of counsel for
his defense.' ' 5 ' For over a century, the Supreme Court con-
strued that phrase merely to allow criminal defendants the
right to have an attorney in court if they could afford one.'59 In
1938, however, the Supreme Court concluded that the Sixth
Amendment forbids the federal courts from "depriv[ing] an
accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the
assistance of counsel.'
160
In Gideon v. Wainwright, '6 the Warren Court stated that
"reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our ad-
versary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
158 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
'
59 WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 21-
30 (1955) (discussing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)). Beginning in
1932, the Court indicated that a death sentence imposed without the benefit
of adequate trial counsel might not comport with the Constitution. In Powell,
the infamous "Scottsboro Boys" case, the state sought to impose capital
punishment on nine black men accused of raping two white women. Id. at 49.
The state trial court did not give the defendants adequate time to secure their
own counsel, and then appointed counsel at the last minute. Id. at 53. In
reversing the convictions, the Supreme Court held that the trial court's
actions had violated the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of "fundamen-
tal fairness," but it limited its holding to the peculiar facts of the case. Id. at
71; see Charles W. Wolfram, Scottsboro Boys in 1991: The Promise of Ade-
quate Criminal Representation Through the Years, 1 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POLVY 61 (1992) (giving an overview of the "Scottsboro Boys" case and the
development of the modem public defender system and its shortcomings).
1 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (holding for the first time
that the Sixth Amendment requires the appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants in federal criminal prosecutions). In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942), which was later overruled by the Court in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963), the Court refused to extend this ruling to the states.
The Betts Court had declined to extend the holding of Johnson to the states
and refused to read Powell as requiring the appointment of counsel when
"special circumstances" are absent. Betts, 316 U.S. at 471-72; see also Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
161 373 U.S. 335 (1963).
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unless counsel is provided for him."'62  It further held in
Douglas v. California" that the right to counsel extends to an
indigent defendant's appeal of his conviction."6 Through Gideon
and later cases," the Supreme Court clarified the idea that a
system under which an indigent criminal defendant has
significantly less access to counsel than a non-indigent
contradicts the principles of our Constitution. 66 These decisions
implied that the right to the assistance of counsel includes the
right to effective counsel; otherwise the Sixth Amendment would
indeed hold out an empty promise to those accused of crimes.
Thus, before Justice O'Connor's appointment, the Court had
frequently recognized the importance of qualified trial and
appellate counsel for indigent defendants.
b. Justice O'Connor's Restrictions on the Availability
of "Effectiveness of Counsel" Claims
President Reagan appealed to the popular fear of increasing
crime rates by arguing that courts were unnecessarily letting
criminals out of prison on technicalities.6 7 The Reagan judicial
162 Id. at 344.
163 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
164 Id. at 357-58 (holding that the Constitution requires that the state
appoint counsel for indigent defendants in all direct state court appeals as of
right). Earlier, the Court had stressed that a state may not grant appellate
review in a manner that "discriminates against some convicted defendants on
account of their poverty." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
"6 See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972) (right to counsel
exists as soon as any judicial proceedings have begun); Coleman v. Alabama,
399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (right to counsel exists at preliminary hearing); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 277 (1967) (right to counsel exists at post-indict-
ment lineup); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964) (custodial interro-
gation as to specific crime creates right to counsel); Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (confession obtained by trickery in non-custodial
setting violates Sixth Amendment right to counsel); White v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (right to counsel attaches at preliminary arraignment in
capital case); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 400 (1977) (a confession
obtained in custody without counsel by "Christian burial speech" violates the
Sixth Amendment).
"
6 Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 17-19 (illustrating the expansion of
the right to counsel during the pre-Rehnquist era); see LEONARD W. LEVY,
AGAINsT THE LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 199 (1974)
(stating that due process requires the right to counsel for all felony indigents).
167 See, e.g., Mary Thornton, Justice Department Official Backs Easing of
Exclusionary Rule, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1981, at A2 (describing Administration
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ideology specifically targeted the right to effective assistance of
counsel." s Through her votes and opinions, Justice O'Connor
helped to raise barriers to relief for defendants complaining of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Consistent with President
Reagan's ideology, Justice O'Connor increased the criminal
defendant's burden of proof by requiring that he show actual
prejudice resulting from his counsel's ineffectiveness. She also
found that deliberate tactical decisions that show terrible legal
judgement do not constitute a ground for relief under the Sixth
Amendment, 169 nor does counsel error in missing statute of
limitations deadlines for appeal. 7 ° Not only have Justice
O'Connor's decisions in this area led to the Court's failure to
fulfill the promise of Gideon, but the expansive toleration of
inept representation has also undermined what remains of the
writ of habeas corpus. 1
i. Justice O'Connor's Dissolution of Inadequate
Counsel Claims
Justice O'Connor's decisions have "provided substantial
support to the states' provision of woefully inadequate counsel
to indigent people facing trial."172  In Strickland v.
approaches to change the rights of criminal defendants).
11 See, e.g., Anastasi Toufexis, The Return of Unequal Justice?, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 1982, at 48 (describing the Reagan Administration negative
position on public defender programs and legal services agencies).
169 See Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 41 n.192.
170 Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2564 (1991). Such instances
of counsel error leave a defendant recourse only through civil damages, while
they remain incarcerated due, at least in part, to the errors or ineffectiveness
of their counsel.
... See Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 29 (imploring that "the full
magnitude of the Rehnquist Era Court's persistent undermining of the federal
habeas writ [cannot] be fully grasped" without examining the Court's inade-
quate decisions on the right to counsel).
.
72 Id. at 33; cf John A. Martin & Michelle Travis, Defending the
Indigent During a War on Crime, 1 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoLy 69 (1992)
(discussing the difficulties in providing adequate indigent defense while public
sentiment runs against the rights of the accused); Marilyn L. Ray, Selecting a
System for the Legal Representation of People Who are Unable to Afford
Retained Counsel: A Case Study, 1 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 105 (1992)
(analyzing the public defender and legal services systems in New York State).
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Washington,7 s Justice O'Connor's majority opinion formulated
an extremely difficult standard for criminal defendants to estab-
lish constitutional error due to ineffective counsel.174 To obtain
a reversal, a criminal defendant must show "that counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness."175  In Strickland, the Court also required a
showing that this ineffective representation actually prejudiced
the defendant, or that it "so undermined the proper functioning
of the adversarial process"' 6 that there is a "reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."' 7
Consequently, "[e]ven in cases in which the performances of
counsel have passed constitutional muster under the test of
Strickland v. Washington and executions have been carried out,
the representation provided has nevertheless been of very poor
quality."'78 Thus Justice O'Connor's restrictive interpretation of
'73 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
1'74 Id. at 687-88, 690.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 686.
177 Id. at 694. Tabak and Lane clarify the practical result of O'Connor's
rule by highlighting a later case following Strickland, in which the Fifth
Circuit denied relief to Raymond G. Riles of Texas:
To me, a sufficient showing has been made that trial counsel did
not provide this accused with the quality of defense essential to
adequate representation in any serious felony case, and particularly
in a capital case.... The briefs and argument of current
counsel... together with the record, indicate that, if Riles' trial
counsel had been able, the jury might not have imposed the death
penalty. Precedent requires me to agree that this is not enough to
[grant relief]. The Constitution, as interpreted by the courts, does
not require that the accused, even in a capital case, be represented
by able or effective counsel. It requires representation only by a
lawyer who is not ineffective under the standard set by Strickland
v. Washington. Proof that the lawyer was ineffective requires proof
not only that the lawyer bungled but also that his errors likely
affected the result. Ineffectiveness is not measured against the
standards set by good lawyers but by the average - "reason-
ableness under prevailing professional norms" - and "judicial
scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly differential [sic]."
Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 33-34 (citing Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d
947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring)) (citations omitted).
.
78 Habeas Corpus Hearings, supra note 149, at 479-81 (Prepared State-
ment of John Curtin, President, American Bar Association, and James
Liebman, Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law). Tabak and
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the right to counsel negates Gideon's promise that denial of life
and liberty should not turn on the defendant's inability to retain
competent counsel.
ii. The Fateful Combination of Justice O'Connor's
Jurisprudence Regarding the Right to Counsel
and Habeas Corpus
Justice O'Connor's restrictions on right to counsel claims
amplify the burdensome requirement that in order to obtain
relief, a habeas corpus petitioner must show cause and actual
prejudice resulting from an alleged constitutional violation.'
If a defendant's counsel fails to raise important issues or misses
statutes of limitations, the defendant may not obtain relief
under Justice O'Connor's interpretation of the Constitution.8 0
A court will grant an inmate's petition for relief only if a habeas
petitioner can show some "objective factor external to the
Lane discuss a couple of typical cases on this point. Tabak & Lane, supra
note 116, at 34. In one case, the defense counsel never tried to contact any
mitigation witnesses and did not attempt to learn about the defendant's
academic, medical or psychological history. Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026,
1027 (1987), denying cert. to 762 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). In another case, counsel put on virtually no defense, did only
minimal cross-examination, made no objections and emphasized the horrible-
ness of the crime (even hinting in closing argument that death was the most
appropriate sentence for the crime), and failed to put in available evidence in
mitigation of the penalty. Messer v. Kemp, 474 U.S. 1088, 1089-90 (1986),
denying cert. to 760 F.2d 1080 (11th Cir. 1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Mitchell was executed on September 1, 1987. Before Execution, A Parting
Shot, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 2, 1987, at 11; see Robber Who Killed Fourteen
Year Old Dies in Electric Chair in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1987, at A12.
Messer was executed on July 28, 1988. Convicted Murderer Executed in
Georgia, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 29, 1988, at 8; see Convicted Murderer
Executed in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1988, at B5.
..
9 See supra notes 109-157 and accompanying text.
o See supra notes 169-178 and accompanying text.
1993] 159
160 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol.3:121
defense"'' that prevented compliance with the rule or
incompetence of counsel under the Strickland test.'82
Justice O'Counor's decisions in this area effectuate the
Reagan agenda of making it more difficult for habeas corpus
petitioners to obtain relief." Furthermore, if defense counsel
makes a deliberate, but terrible, tactical decision not to pursue
certain claims, the federal courts have no power to reverse state
convictions for ineffectiveness of counsel."M
Justice O'Connor's approach allows low quality defense
work by appointed counsel, which is perhaps the greatest factor
undermining the fairness of criminal trials.185 Her opinions, in
this area as well as in habeas corpus, defer to courts that
tolerate inadequate counsel and then apply procedural bars to
constitutional claims that those appointed lawyers, through
ignorance or neglect, fail to raise. She has emphasized that
Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases are really "about
federalism... [they concern] the respect that federal courts owe
the States and State's procedural rules."'86 Justice O'Connor's
181 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1,
16 (1984) (holding that a "novel" claim "not reasonably available to counsel" is
sufficient to show cause for a habeas petition). In one example of the extreme
circumstances necessary to obtain relief under this prong, the Court in
Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988), granted the petitioner relief on a jury
discrimination claim where the prosecution intentionally rigged the jury
selection process to discriminate against women and blacks in a way that was
difficult to detect.
182 See supra notes 173-178 and accompanying text.
18" The Reagan proposal indicated that counsel errors that do not signal
that the lawyer is totally incompetent do not show sufficient cause for habeas
corpus intervention in state proceedings, even though the Justice Depart-
ment's commentary recognized that questions relating to "cause" have arisen
"most frequently" in cases in which procedural default resulted from counsel's
"error or misjudgment" falling short of ineffective assistance. Like O'Connor's
ultimate decision in Strickland, the Justice Department commentary conceded
that courts had found "cause" in such cases, but it urged that those cases were
wrong and that "cause" should be found only when the prisoner can demon-
strate an independent violation of the Sixth Amendment. Yackle, supra note
107, at 611-20.
184 See Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 19-20 (Counsel who make
mistakes in their assessment of their clients' cases, which cost the latter their
liberty or their lives, show that the attorney is competent, not deficient,
because he has winnowed down legal arguments according to Justice
O'Connor's standard.).
'
85 Id. at 94.
18 Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991). The Virginia judges
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effectuation of the Reagan agenda against releasing criminal
defendant's on "technicalities," such as the right to counsel,
supports the assertion that President Reagan appointed her to
pursue these goals.
3. Justice O'Connor's Deference to States in Capital
Punishment Cases
At her confirmation hearings, Justice O'Connor stated that
she favored the death penalty.187 She emphasized, however,
that her personal support for it would have no effect on her
impartial determination of cases."s Yet, an examination of her
votes and opinions in this area reveals that she rarely perceives
constitutional limitations on or problems with the imposition of
this punishment. This subsection briefly examines death
penalty jurisprudence in the decade prior to Justice O'Connor's
appointment to the Supreme Court, and then it explores the
effect she has had on this area of law.
a. Death Penalty Jurisprudence Before Justice O'Connor
Nearly a decade before Justice O'Connor's confirmation, the
Supreme Court recognized that the practice of giving a jury "un-
trammeled discretion"1"9 to impose a death sentence on a
defendant convicted of a capital offense violated the Eighth
Amendment.19 Furman v. Georgia and its progeny 91 required
had dismissed Coleman's case because his lawyer had bungled the time to
make an appeal; Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, refused to consider
the merits of the criminal defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Id. at 2565. Thus, in the Rehnquist court, in part due to O'Connor's
votes and opinions, procedural rules prevail over the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.
" See discussion supra note 24.
188Id.
189 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 247 (1972) (quoting McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971)); see Furman, 408 U.S. at 306-10 (Stew-
art, J., concurring); id. at 310-14 (White, J., concurring); id. at 251-59 (Doug-
las, J., concurring); Lori L. Nader, Note, Walton v. Arizona: The Confusion
Surrounding the Sentencing of Capital Defendants Continues, 40 CATH. U. L.
REV. 475, 476 (1991).
" "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
19 The Furman line of cases consists of Furman itself and the five death
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the replacement of "arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with
objective standards to guide"'92 the imposition of the death
penalty. Before this landmark decision, juries were "free to sen-
tence [convicted defendants] to death or to life without any
standards or guidelines to help (or force) them to make rational
or uniform sentencing choices."'93 Jurors often imposed death
penalties against minorities and the poor in an "arbitrary or
'freakish' manner, if not actually discriminatorily and
capriciously."'' Prior to the election of Ronald Reagan and the
Supreme Court appointment of Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court
had established a "standard of fairness and consistency"195 for
death penalty cases.
penalty cases of 1976: Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffit v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976).
192 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
... Raymond J. Pascucci, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the
Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1145 (1984)
(citations omitted).
" Joshua N. Sondheiner, Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation:
The Improper Consideration of Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty Sentenc-
ing, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 409, 413 (1990) (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 310
(Stewart , J., concurring)) (footnotes omitted). Justice Stewart noted that "of
all the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as
reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected
random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed."
408 U.S. at 310-11. The decision in Furman implicitly overruled McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), which rejected the contention that discretion-
ary death penalty sentencing violated the fundamental fairness standards of
Due Process. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 599 (1978).
See Pascucci, supra note 193, at 1143 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 257
(Douglas, J., concurring)). "[Ilt is 'cruel and unusual' to apply the death
penalty - or any other penalty - selectively to minorities whose numbers are
few, who are outcasts of society, who are unpopular, but whom society is
willing to see suffer though it would not countenance general application of
the same penalty across the board." Furman, 408 U.S. at 245.
Later decisions characterized death sentences imposed during this period
as "pregnant with discrimination." Lockett 438 U.S. at 600 (citing Furman,
408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring)).
195 Pascucci, supra note 193, at 1164.
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b. Justice O'Connor's Expansion of the Availability of
the Death Penalty
President Reagan disagreed with the Court's idea of an
appropriate standard and his judicial agenda included greater
deference to trial court imposition of capital punishment.'96
Since her appointment to the Court, Justice O'Connor has
frequently voted against the defendant in capital cases. Justice
O'Connor's ideological deference to government officials in their
maintenance of law and order has resulted in the expansion of
the availability of capital punishment.
In her votes and opinions, Justice O'Connor has narrowly
construed the rights of criminal defendants under the Eighth
Amendment. By voting for deference to state legislatures,
which are "uniquely suited to select goals and modes of pun-
ishment," Justice O'Connor has allowed the imposition of the
death penalty on accomplices not present at a victim's mur-
der. 9  Justice O'Connor also played a pivotal role in the Court's
conclusion that the capital punishment of convicted murderers
who were minors 9 8 or mentally retarded' 99 did not automatically
violate the Constitution. In Penry v. Lynaugh,0 ° Justice
O'Connor wrote for the 5-4 Court that "a new rle placing a
' See supra text accompanying note 3.
'
97 For example, she wrote a dissent in Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 825
(1982), finding death not to be a disproportionate penalty for the driver of a
getaway car who did not participate in or witness the killing, deferring to the
trial judge because he is "best able to assess the defendant's blameworthi-
ness." Id. at 826.
198 Stanford v. Kentucky, 429 U.S. 361 (1989). See generally Twila L.
Perry, Justice O'Connor and Children and the Law, 13 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
81 (1991).
" Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). O'Connor voted to overturn
the death sentence of a mentally retarded defendant because the jury
instructions were unfair. However, she found that the execution of a mentally
retarded defendant is not prohibited by the Constitution. She concluded that
"[m]ental retardation is a factor that may well lessen a defendant's culpability
for a capital offense. But we cannot conclude today that the Eighth Amend-
ment precludes the execution of any mentally retarded person of Penry's
ability convicted of a capital offense simply by virtue of his or her mental
retardation." Id. at 340. Her opinion turned on the fact that the state did not
ensure that jurors carefully consider the evidence of a murderer's retardation
as a mitigating factor. Id. at 318. She added that a person's mental age is
not reason to take away the person's legal rights or responsibilities, whether
to marry or to be punished for a crime. Id.
20D Id.
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certain class of individuals beyond the State's power to punish
by death is analogous to a new rule placing certain conduct
beyond the State's power to punish at all. ' 20 1  Thus, Justice
O'Connor's ideological votes assisted in the realization of
Reagan's agenda that neither the Constitution nor the Court
would stand in the way of the execution of these classes of
offenders.
Combining her attacks on the rights of criminal defendants,
and on civil rights, Justice O'Connor assisted Reagan's agenda
even further in McCleskey v. Kemp, °2 when, along with four
others, she repudiated the use of statistical evidence to show
that the sentencing of a capital defendant probably involved
discrimination. °3
4. Summary
Justice O'Connor's votes and opinions have significantly
reduced the rights of criminal defendants. O'Connor has un-
dermined the viability of federal habeas corpus petitions
through her application of a total exhaustion rule, severe
restrictions on subsequent habeas petitions, and the imposition
201 Id. at 329-30. Thus, Justice O'Connor observed that a holding that a
mentally retarded person could not constitutionally be executed would be a
new rule that would be subject to the first Teague exception. Id. at 329. She
cited as examples the Court's holdings that an insane person could not be
executed, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and that execution was
not a constitutionally acceptable punishment for rape, Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977). Penry, 492 U.S. at 330. According to Tabak and Lane,
There are two "narrow" exceptions to Teague's nonretroactivity rule.
The first is that a "new" constitutional rule will be applied retroac-
tively in habeas corpus "if it places certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe." The second exception is that a "new" rule
should be applied retroactively in habeas corpus "if it requires the
observance of those procedures that... are implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty."
Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 48 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
307 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quotations omitted in original).
202 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
20s Id. She rejected claims that the Georgia capital punishment system
was infected with racial discrimination, and therefore filled with cruel and
unusual punishment. O'Connor joined the majority opinion that discounted
the famous Baldus study detailing how Georgia prosecuted and punished
murderers and showed disparate impact depending on the race of the victim.
Id. at 291.
IDEOLOGY & ADVICE AND CONSENT
of an actual prejudice standard of review. Additionally, she has
taken a narrow view of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
and expanded the availability of the death penalty. Justice
O'Connor's decisions have coincided with the Reagan
Administration's agenda for legal change, while imposing
restrictions on the effectiveness of habeas writs which Congress
had rejected. Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence demonstrates
that she is ideologically inclined to restrict the rights of criminal
defendants, notwithstanding her statements during Senate
confirmation that she had no judicial agenda.
III. APPOINTMENTS AND CONSENT: THE PHILO-
SOPHICAL CASE FOR REJECTING A SUPREME
COURT NOMINEE BASED ON IDEOLOGY
The preceding study of the relationship between ideology
and jurisprudence in the decisions of- Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor lends pragmatic support to the argument for Senate
analysis of the ideological perspectives of Supreme Court
nominees. Some opponents of ideological review express
concern that such an inquiry can diminish the public perception
of the Court.2' However, prohibiting inquiry into a nominee's
ideology "does not create even the illusion of neutrality; it only
perpetuates ignorance about the individual's actual beliefs.
'2 °5
214 See Richard Friedman, The Transformation in Senate Response to
Supreme Court Nominations: From Reconstruction to the Taft Administration
and Beyond, 5 CAEDOZO L. REV. 1, 85 (1983). See generally ALEXANDER
BICEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) (arguing that the Court lacks
enforcement power and must rely on the 'political branches' as well as public
perception for the enforcement and power of its decisions.).
For a general discussion of the potential for diminished public percep-
tions through active senate inquiry of nominees, see Rees, supra note 9,
observing that
The danger of an appearance of impropriety is increased by the fact
that, if it is legitimate for a Senator to vote against a nominee with
whose constitutional (or even social or economic) views he dis-
agrees, then fuller discussion of constitutional questions will
presumably result in more negative votes on opinion grounds. This,
in turn, might lead some people to suggest that when a nominee
agrees with Senators on constitutional questions it is in order to be
confirmed.
Id. at 961 (citation omitted).
205 Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology, Judicial Selection and Judicial Ethics,
2 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmcs 643, 660 (1989) (discussing the arguments in favor of
the "ideological orientation" approach to evaluating judges, in the context of
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Critics of a vigorous senatorial role in the appointment process
contend that inquiry into ideology would threaten the integrity
and independence of the judiciary."0 6 Yet the potential for
judicial decisions that threaten the integrity of the rights and
principles enshrined in the Constitution must outweigh concerns
about the impact of senatorial scrutiny of a nominee's ideology
on the Court's prestige as an institution.20 ' Because ideology
does affect judicial decision-making, the appointment process
should be viewed as essentially political.20 ' Therefore, concerns
about politicization fail to acknowledge the strong role that
ideology or political factors actually play in both selection and
adjudication.
The debate regarding the propriety of asking a candidate
about, or rejecting a nominee because of, ideological preferences
the Robert Bork nomination and the California Supreme Court retention
elections).
206 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Inviting Judicial Activism: A "Liberal" or
"Conservative" Technique?, 15 GA. L. REV. 539, 553-57 (1981) (referring to
proposed questions on constitutional law for all nominees to the federal bench
as a terrible instance of "attempts to politicize the judiciary" and as a threat
to "the independence and integrity" of federal judges); see ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 346-47
(1990); Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185
(1988).
207 See Black, supra note 14, at 663-64 (concluding that no strong reasons
refute the pragmatic justification for active senatorial review of Supreme
Court nominees' ideologies and implicit agendas).
2 08 Henry P. Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1202 (1988). Because of the linkage between politics and
ideology, this Article advocates the viewing of the process as political rather
than non-political. However, to the extent that a political view of the appoint-
ment process can denigrate into pure partisan politics, this Article prefers to
focus the evaluation of candidates on ideology rather than on political
affiliation. See generally Black, supra note 14; John P. Frank, The Appoint-
ment of Supreme Court Justices: Prestige, Principles and Politics, 1941 WIs.
L. REV. 172 (1941); Luis Kutner, Advice and Dissent: Due Process of the
Senate, 23 DEPAUL L. REv. 658 (1974); Note, Must a Supreme Court Justice
Refuse To Answer Senators' Questions?, 78 YALE L.J. 696 (1969); Advice and
Consent on Supreme Court Nominations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States
Senate, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975) (Every witness that addressed the issue
stated that a nominee's philosophy should be considered.). Robert Meserve,
former President of the American Bar Association, stated that "political or
ideological grounds... are very important considerations in the selection of a
Supreme Court Justice, perhaps the most important considerations that the
Senate should consider." Id. at 4.
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remains unresolved." 9 By supplementing the arguments for the
legitimacy of Senate discussion of a Supreme Court nominee's
ideology, this Article seeks to spur public dialogue about the
meaning of the Constitution and the role that ideology already
plays in the interpretation of the civil rights clauses and
statutes. An examination of the theoretical arguments for
inquiry into a judicial nominee's ideological perspective provides
strong support for the legitimacy of Senate rejection or
confirmation of Supreme Court nominees based on ideology. In
fact, these justifications tend to support the notion that
Senators have a duty to undertake an ideological examination of
Supreme Court nominees.21
This section first examines the language of the Constitution
and its historical context. It then sets forth the political theory
argument favoring a strong Senate role in the appointment
process and the history of Senate consideration of a nominee's
209 The question of the role of ideology in the confirmation process
remains unanswered today. Even Republican Senator Arlen Specter
acknowledged that one of the key questions confronting senators "was what
weight, if any, the Senate should give to judicial philosophy." Arlen Specter,
Concluding Address: On the Confirmation of a Supreme Court Justice, 84 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1037, 1039 (1990) (also noting "historically ... that ideology had
played a significant role in the Senate's rejection of nominees ranging from
John Rutledge, in 1795, to Harold Carswell, in 1970").
Robert Bork's controversial confirmation hearings did not resolve the
issue of the weight to be accorded ideology after the Senate determines the
nominee's legal competence, integrity, and judicial temperament. See BORK,
supra note 206, at 346-47 (criticizing members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee for inquiring into and insisting on answers to "doctrinal"
questions). Bork insists that his rejection was ideological and vengeful. Id. at
349; see also DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER 111 (1990) (attributing Bork's
rejection to his controversial views and his association with conservative legal
policy goals).
21 See Rees, supra note 9, at 919 ("If... it would have been proper for
Senators to base their votes in whole or in part upon Justice O'Connor's
constitutional philosophy, then no Senator could have cast an informed vote
without access to information that was not in the record of the hearings,"
because of her refusal to answer those kinds of questions.). Rees added that:
If a Senator may legitimately vote to confirm or reject a nominee
because of the nominee's positions on questions of constitutional
law or related questions of social and economic policy - and
especially if... a Senator has a duty to base his vote at least partly
on the nominee's views - then the Senator should endeavor to
familiarize himself with these views. It does not follow that the
nominee has a constitutional obligation to assist the Senator in his
quest.
IdM at 947-48 (emphasis in original).
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ideology. Finally, this section identifies the pragmatic
justification for considering a nominee's ideological perspective.
A. BACKGROUND ON THE ADVICE AND CONSENT CLAUSE
The Advice and Consent Clause states that "[the President]
shall have the power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate to... nominate, and by and with the consent of the
Senate, shall appoint... Judges of the [Slupreme Court."21' An
examination of the historical record surrounding the ratification
of the Constitution suggests that Senators should consider any
factors that they believe bear on the wisdom of confirming the
nominee.2 2
An examination of the thought underpinning this ambigu-
ous clause at the time of the Constitution's ratification supports
a strong Senate role in the confirmation of Supreme Court
nominees.21 In Federalist Number 76, Alexander Hamilton
argues that the Senate's power to reject nominees "would be an
excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and
would tend greatly to preventing the appointment of unfit
characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from
personal attachment, or from a view to popularity."'214 David
Danelski suggests that the Framers' intent as evinced by the
211 U.S. CONST art. II, § 2. See generally David J. Danelski, Ideology as
a Ground for the Rejection of the Bork Nomination, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 900
(1990) (discussing the Tribe and Black theses and concluding that the
argument based on "original intent" provides the strongest justification for
ideological or political inquiry into Supreme Court nominees).
21 Black, supra note 14, at 662 (finding no "hint that the Senators may
not or ought not, in voting on a nominee, take into account anything that
they, as serious and public-spirited men, think to bear on the wisdom of the
appointment"). For the argument that the Framers' intent is impossible to
determine, see Brennan's Speech, supra note 3; Rees, supra note 9, at 935-36.
213 See Danelski, supra note 211, at 916-17 (concluding that the historical
record "supports Charles Black's view that the framers intended that the
Senate have a broad role in passing on Supreme Court nominations"). But see
Brennan's Speech, supra note 3 ("It is a little more than arrogance cloaked in
humility ... to pretend that from our vantage we can gauge accurately the
intent of the Framers... the ultimate question must be, what do the words
of the text mean in our time?").
214 THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
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Federalist Papers lays a foundation for inquiry into the ideology
of Supreme Court nominees. 15
Documents from the time of the Federal Convention also
support the argument that the Framers intended that the
Senate play an active role in deciding whether or not to confirm
a nominee.2 1 ' For example, Roger Sherman, a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, noted the importance of the Senate's
role in the appointment process "for aiding and supporting the
executive, securing the rights of the individual states, the
government of the United States, and the liberty of the
people. 2 1  While this historical evidence does not explicitly
mention Senate rejection of nominees based on the nominee's
ideological perspective, it does reveal a contemplation of shared
power between the political branches in determining who may
serve as a justice of the Supreme Court. The record indicates
that the Senate's role was conceived of as a significant check on
the President's power of appointment in order to protect the
people and the country.
"' See Danelski, supra note 211, at 916-17. For instance, Alexander
Hamilton, who first suggested executive and legislative cooperation in the
appointment of judicial nominees, contended that the senate was intended to
play a significant role in the appointment process:
The POWER which can originate the disposition of honors and
emoluments, is more likely to attract than to be attracted by the
POWER which can merely obstruct their course. If by influencing
the President be meant restraining him, this is precisely what must
have been intended.
THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 516-17 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (emphasis in original).
216 Danelski, supra note 211, at 918 (noting, for instance, that "[alt the
Pennsylvania ratification convention, James Wilson - who at the Constitu-
tional Convention had supported placing appointments solely in the execu-
tive - acknowledged that the Senate was to play an important role in the
process," adding that "in the exercise of the appointment power 'the Senate
stands controlled. If it is that monster which it [is] said to be, it can only
show its teeth; it is unable to bite or devour."') (discussing 1 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 119, and quoting 2 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 480 (Jensen ed. 1976)).
2 17 Danelski, supra note 211, at 918 (quoting Letter from Roger Sherman
to John Adams (July 20, 1789), reprinted in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMs 440
(1851)). "Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth wrote Governor Samuel
Huntington on Sept. 26, 1787: 'The equal representation of the states in the
senate, and the voice of that branch in the appointment of offices, will secure
the rights of the lesser as well as the greater states."' Id. at 918 n.90 (citation
omitted).
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B. THE SENATE'S ROLE AS A CHECK ON THE PRESIDENT'S
APPOINTMENT POWER
The ideologies of Supreme Court justices play an important
role in determining the constitutionality or proper interpretation
of statutory provisions that have a significant impact on
individual rights. The power to interpret statutes was
entrusted to the Court to protect individual rights from popular
excesses. This Article envisions the Court as holding a sacred
trust to protect judicially enforceable rights against tyranny."'
The advice and consent process is the only democratic check
on the federal judiciary. "[Ilt is precisely because federal judges
are essentially immune from external checks once they are on
the bench that they [must] be carefully scrutinized prior to their
confirmation."" 9 Additionally, a strong Senate inquiry can help
provide a check against the appointment of individuals whose
ideological perspective is overly deferential to majority actions
that may trample upon the rights of minorities in a way that is
contrary to the explicit guarantees of the Constitution.220
21' For an early exposition of the proposition that the Constitution was
designed with checks and balances to protect people from tyranny, see THE
FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961):
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on
government would be necessary. In framing a government which is
to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in
this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on
the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but
experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precau-
tions.
Id. at 349.
Dividing the power between the executive and legislative branches for
the appointment of federal judges is a structural check against excessive
power. The bill of rights is another precaution against political tyranny. See
LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CoNSTrruTIoN 6
(1991); see also BERNARD BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 273 (1967) ("Everyone knew the basic prescription for a wise and
just government. It was so to balance the contending powers in society that
no one power could overwhelm the others and, unchecked, destroy the
liberties that belonged to all.").
219 Chemerinsky, supra note 205, at 650 (adding that "[s]election by the
President and confirmation by the Senate properly exists precisely to have
some majoritarian influence over the composition" of the Court).
220 Id. at 651. The rejection of Robert Bork provides a controversial
application of this aspect of checks and balances. See S. Rep. No. 7, 100th
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Some contend that subjecting a Supreme Court nominee to
active majoritarian review, through strong Senate inquiry
during the advice and consent process, would undermine the
separation necessary to fulfill this trust.2 ' However, once
appointed, federal judges have life tenure and are immune from
salary reduction.2 22  Thus federal judges are assured of
independence from the political branches, and may safely adopt
any interpretation of the Constitution or statutes regardless of
popular opinion.
Justice O'Connor's jurisprudential cohesion with the Reagan
ideological hostility toward these minority rights supports this
argument for ideological review of Supreme Court nominees.
Her assertion of judicial neutrality and refusals to discuss
statutory and constitutional interpretation on vital issues of the
day denied the Senate and the public their opportunity to
consider them.2 Supreme Court justices "possess substantial
discretion especially in interpreting an expansively worded
document like the Constitution .... Ideology inevitably
influences the exercise of that discretion."" Given the impact
of ideology on the interpretation of vital constitutional
Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 37 (1987) (Senate Judiciary Committee based its opposition
to Bork's nomination on his political ideology as well as his judicial philosophy
because he 'lacks the sensitivity and commitment to assuring equal justice
under law for all Americans that any Supreme Court Justice should possess.").
' Carter, supra note 206, at 1198.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
See SPAETH & BRENNER, supra note 28, at 244 (concluding that "[flor
those who would preserve and perpetuate the myth that judges only find, and
do not make the law, judicial activism and restraint may be useful concepts.
But most people who have reached adulthood no longer believe the myth
anyway").
However, active Senate inquiry can play an important role in educating
and involving the public in a discussion of the meaning of rights under the
Constitution. For example, the Bork nomination generated such controversy
that:
[flor a few weeks, the nation's attention was riveted on the Consti-
tution. Conversations were dominated by discussions- of whether
the Constitution should be limited to the Framers' views and
whether there should be a right to privacy. Such discussions are
important in informing the public about the content of the Constitu-
tion and the nature of judicial decision-making.
Chemerinsky, supra note 205, at 656.
' Chemerinsky, supra note 205, at 648.
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protections, it is both appropriate and necessary to consider a
nominee's views on issues likely to come before the Court.
225
C. HISTORICAL PRECEDENT FOR IDEOLOGICAL INQUIRY
Charles Black contends that there is no historical basis for
rejecting a strong Senate role in the appointment process.225
Similarly, Laurence Tribe concludes that in six historical
instances where Supreme Court nominees were rejected due to
Id. at 647. The illogic of Justice O'Connor's refusal to discuss issues
that might come before the court is best illustrated by Justice Rehnquist's
observation that "[p]roof that a Justice's mind at the time [s]he joined the
Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication
would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias." Laird v. Tatum,
409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (memorandum denying motion to recuse Justice
Rehnquist); see also Rees, supra note 9, at 948 (evaluating O'Connor's position
that "if sharing one's opinions with Senators prior to confirmation constitutes
prejudgment," then "a nominee is bound to withhold the information notwith-
standing its relevance to the decision the Senators have to make").
Rees discusses the implications of O'Connor's prejudgment statement in
great detail. Id. at 950-51. He stated that
O'Connor's suggestion that a statement of opinion on a constitu-
tional question would amount to "prejudgment' of future cases...
is perhaps the broadest statement on record of the standard for
judicial disqualification. Justice O'Connor apparently made no
distinction between prejudging a case and forming an abstract
opinion on an issue before it has presented itself in a case .... It
has never been thought to require the judge not to form opinions on
questions of law simply because he might someday be forced to
decide these questions.
Id. (emphasis in original). Rees also reiterates Justice Rehnquist's historical
points that Justice Black wrote the Fair Labor Standards Act and later upheld
it as constitutional in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), Justice
Frankfurter wrote a book about labor injunctions and later ruled on that issue
in United States v. Hutchenson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), and Chief Justice
Hughes wrote the opinion in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), when he had written a book on the subject before his appointment. Id.
at 953.
226 Black, supra note 14, at 661-62; see also Carter, supra note 206, at
1187; Monaghan, supra note 208, at 1204-07; Rees, supra note 9, at 938;
Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L. REV.
672, 677 (1989). Black further noted that the history of Senate rejections of
Supreme Court nominees is "confusing and multifarious." Black, supra note
14, at 663 (Nominees have been rejected for mediocrity, partisan politics, and
"repugnancy of the nominees' views on great issues," mentioning explicitly two
rejections as of 1970 based on the nominee's views.).
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their political, judicial, or economic philosophies,22 the
nominees' views were an important part of their evaluation. 28
Tribe contends that these historical precedents validate a
senator's consideration of both the constitutional views of a
nominee and the potential impact of a nominee on the existence
of an ideological balance on the Court. 29
While past consideration of ideology does not necessarily
make an affirmative case for the value of such an inquiry, it
2-7 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAvE THIS HONORABLE COURT: How THE
CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY 79-80, 86-89 (1985)
(John Rutledge (1795), John J. Crittenden (1829), George W. Woodward
(1846), Jeremiah S. Black (1861), Caleb Cushing (1874), and John J. Parker
(1930)).
2s Id. at 86-89. He also discusses the nominations of Roger B. Taney
(first nomination, 1835), Stanley Matthews (first nomination, 1881), and G.
Harrold Carswell (1970) but he believes that their rejections were not clearly
due to ideology. Id. Additionally, he does not attribute the rejections of Abe
Fortas to Chief Justice (1968), or of Clement F. Haynesworth to Associate
Justice (1969) solely to ideology. Id. at 38, 88-89; see also Herman Schwartz,
The Senate's Right to Reject, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1987 at A27 (noting "[o]f
some 27 rejections or withdrawals under fire, more than one-third were for
ideological reasons").
The role of ideology in the Fortas nomination has been disputed by
scholars. See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 598 (1988) (rejection was ideological). But see E.
BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE 115-16 (1989); Paul Freund, Appointment of
Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1155 (1988).
TRIBE, supra note 227, at 93, 100.
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does help to refute the myth that ideological inquiry is a recent
phenomenon.30 As Tribe concluded,
One need not endorse the opinions espoused by those
Senators who cast negative votes on confirmation, nor
disagree with the positions taken by the nominees who
suffered those rejections, in order to accept the
irrefutable historical evidence that, for reasons both
good and bad, the Senate has long judged candidates
for the Supreme Court on the basis of what they be-
lieve.23 '
The history of Senate rejection of nominees based on the
candidates' ideologies supplements the pragmatic and inter-
pretive arguments for this type of Senate activism.
D. JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY PLAYS AN INTEGRAL ROLE IN
SHAPING THE LAW
Perhaps this Article's model of the Senate's role in
evaluating potential judges may best "be defended in the
230 See BORK, supra note 209, at 337-43 (criticizing his ideological
rejection as illegitimate liberal activism and deplorable politicization of the
law). That only six Supreme Court nominees have been rejected for their
ideology may suggest that the historical argument for ideological inquiry rests
on aberrations. However, many nominees have been confirmed on an
ideological basis as well. See TRIBE, supra note 227, at 50-92; JOSEPH P.
HARRIS, THE ADvIcE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE (Greenwood Press 1968).
Harris commented:
The increasing role of the Supreme Court in passing upon social
and economic measures has led to greater attention [by the Senate
in confirmation hearings since 18941 to the philosophy, record, and
attitudes of nominees on such issues, and far less concern than
formerly to their party regularity ... only five nominations [be-
tween 1900 and 19531 to the Supreme Court have faced serious
opposition in the Senate: those of [Louis D.] Brandeis (1916),
[Harlan Fiske] Stone (1925), [Charles] Hughes (1930), [John J.]
Parker (1930), and [Hugo] Black (1937). In each and every case the
opposition was due to the philosophy and supposed stand of the
nominee on social and economic issues rather than to partisan
considerations.
Id. at 303. All but Parker were confirmed by substantial margins. Id. at 113,
117, 126, 131, and 308 (respectively).
31 TRIBE, supra note 227, at 89. See Danelski supra note 211, at 920, for
an evaluation of the Tribe thesis concluding that the historical basis is not
irrefutable but, nonetheless, ideological inquiry is justified.
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simplest terms: ideology should be considered because ideology
matters. Judges are not fimgible; a person's ideology influences
how he or she will vote on important issues. It is appropriate
for an evaluator to pay careful attention to the likely conse-
quences of an individual's presence on a court. ' 2 32 Because
ideology matters, the appointment process should openly
consider the ideological perspective of a president's nominee to
the nation's highest court. To preserve the integrity of the
confirmation process, the role of ideology in judicial
interpretation should be openly acknowledged and should
inform the decision about whether or not to confirm a particular
candidate to the Court.
Historical analysis reveals that the ideology of both the
nominator and the nominee have a significant effect on the
adjudication of cases before the Supreme Court. 3  While
Supreme Court justices are independent and are not merely the
puppets of their nominator, they undeniably have ideological
perspectives that affect the way they interpret the law. Respect
for the profound influence that justices have on the
interpretation of rights under the Constitution and statutes
warrants that the Senate consider the impact an individual's
ideology may have on their interpretation of legal rights and
remedies.
Perhaps the most eloquent argument for Senate consider-
ation of the ideology of Supreme Court nominees was stated
twenty years ago by Charles L. Black, Jr. In his thorough
discussion of the judicial selection process, he stated that
there is just no reason at all for a Senator's not voting,
in regard to confirmation of a Supreme Court nominee,
on the basis of a full and unrestricted review, not
embarrassed by any presumption, of the nominee's
fitness for the office. In a world that knows a man's
social philosophy shapes his judicial behavior, that
22 Chemerinsky, supra note 205, at 648.
TRIBE, supra note 227, at 51-54. See generally, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra
note 6. But cf. Linda Greenhouse, Candid Look at High Court Finds that
Presidents Can't Pack Bench, N.Y. TIMES, October 20, 1984, at 1 (quoting
Justice William Rehnquist, Presidential Appointments to the Supreme Court,
Address at the University of Minnesota College of Law (October 19, 1984) (on
file at the Supreme Court), stating that while presidents have the full right to
pack the Court, presidents are likely to be disappointed by the votes and
opinions of their nominees).
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philosophy is a factor in his fitness. If it is a
philosophy the Senator thinks will make a judge whose
service on the Bench will hurt the country, then the
Senator can do right only by treating this judgment of
his, unencumbered by deference to the President's, as a
satisfactory basis in itself for a negative vote. I have as
yet seen nothing textual, nothing structural, nothing
prudential, nothing historical, that tells against this
view.2"4
The Court's decisions, and the justices' "social philosophies,"
have a significant impact on public policy, and this reality
justifies senatorial review of a nominee's ideology.235 Common
sense supports the proposition that the Senate should "assert its
vision of the public good against that of the President" by
rejecting or confirming nominees based upon the notions of
public good inherent in a candidate's ideology. 236 Furthermore,
the interplay of ideology and interpretation in Justice
O'Connor's jurisprudence regarding minority rights and the
rights of criminal defendants supports the theoretical
4 Black, supra note 14, at 663-64 (adding that a "Senator properly may,
or even at some times in duty must, vote against a nominee to that Court, on
the ground that the nominee holds views which, when transposed into judicial
decisions, are likely, in the Senator's judgment, to be very bad for the coun-
try"); see also ROBERT HARRIS, DECISION 94-95 (1971) (a number of senators
decided to vote against the confirmation of Nixon nominee G. Harrold
Carswell because of Black's article); 1 Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1006 (1987)
(Barbara Jordan strongly urged the Senate Judiciary Committee to vote
against Bork based on Black's article.).
' Nagel, supra note 12, at 867 (contending that "[it is now the conven-
tional wisdom to view the appointment process as an appropriate occasion for
the political culture to communicate its views on legal issues to the federal
judiciary and thereby to shape the development of the law," but noting
surprise "that so much emphasis is placed on controlling the identity of the
specific individuals appointed to the bench"); see also Rees, supra note 9, at
923-24.
236 Monaghan, supra note 208, at 1207 ("[Sltatesmanship, prudence,
common sense, and politics" can serve as appropriate basis for rejection.).
Monaghan contends that viewing the process as political allows for the
rejection of a nominee without an unduly personal attack on his or her
character in that "a nominee may be rejected without the Senate having to
establish humiliating propositions, such as that the nominee is a dangerous
radical." Id.
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arguments for strong Senate inquiry into the ideology of
Supreme Court nominees."
CONCLUSION
During his presidency, Ronald Reagan actively sought out
judicial nominees who shared his conservative ideology. In
Sandra Day O'Connor, he found a nominee likely to help
implement some of his desired changes in the law. This Article
shows that she has done so. Justice O'Connor's positions on
aTrmative action, habeas corpus, the right to counsel, and the
death penalty have drastically altered the nature of these issues
in modern federal law.
During her confirmation hearings, Sandra Day O'Connor
perpetuated the myth that personal or political views play no
role in the interpretation of the Constitution. Her confirmation
hearing statements set a precedent for nominees to refuse to
answer questions about their interpretation of the Constitution.
Refusing to answer these questions obscures the role that
ideology plays in interpreting the scope of constitutional rights.
Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence demonstrates that when the
Senate fails to consider ideology in the confirmation process, it
ignores possible threats to the values of freedom and equality
that inform our Constitution.
Lisa R. Gravest
See discussion supra Part II.
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